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Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law
Men are fond of power, especially over what they call their own; and all
men conspired to make the powers of property as extensive as possible.
––Lord Kames1
[The] zealous defense of the copyright owner’s prerogative will, I fear,
stifle the broad dissemination of ideas and information copyright is
intended to nurture.
––Justice Brennan2
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Here comes the breaking news: the American fair use doctrine may have violated
the so-called three-step test, a core minimum standard for copyright protection, originally
created under an amendment to the Berne Convention. Why? According to a recent
World Trade Organization (WTO) panel’s decision,3 the three-step test requires that any
given limitation on copyright be “clearly defined” and “narrow in its scope and reach.”4
Therefore, the broad and flexible nature of the fair use doctrine may render it violative of
the three-step test. The very power wielded by the three-step test, much to the surprise
and shame of American jurists, can indeed ring the death knell for the fair use doctrine
which was proudly and indigenously invented in the United States.
To be sure, as the strongest supporter of enhancing international copyright
protection, the United States is not the only country that is facing the imminent three-step
test challenge. In fact, the challenge looms large for all European Union (EU) members.
For example, in a recent decision, a Dutch court boldly asserted that “the limitation or
restriction imposed on the copyright . . . will only be applicable if [the] preconditions [set
out in the three-step test] are met.”5
Historically, the three-step test was not imbued with such sweeping power. Rather,
it was generally designed to shield authors’ reproduction rights under the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention).6 Yet,
with the recent proliferation of international, regional, and bilateral treaties associated
with copyright protection, the three-step test has been hailed as the panacea for measuring
the legality of all limitations on copyright. For example, the test is incorporated into the
1

HENRY HOME (LORD KAMES), HISTORICAL LAW-TRACTS 154 (4th ed. 1792).
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 579 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3
Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000)
[hereinafter Panel Report].
4
Id. ¶ 6.112.
5
De Nederlandse Dagbladpers/Netherlands, Court of the Hague, 2 March 2005, Case No. 192880 (Neth.), ¶
15.
6
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last
revised July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
2
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs
Agreement)7, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty
(WCT),8 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).9 Based upon its
tripartite conjunctive structure, the three-step test mandates that copyright limitations
shall: (1) be confined to certain special cases; (2) not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work; and (3) not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.
While the three-step test has been widely adopted as a one-size-fits-all standard
measuring the validity of limitations on copyright,10 the creation of copyright limitations
is a highly dynamic legal process that embodies a host of economic, social, cultural and
political values. This is because copyrights “are limited in nature and must ultimately
serve the public good.”11 Underneath the limitations on copyright lies the state’s police
power to regulate the exercise of property rights in order to “advance a substantive
conception of a just and attractive intellectual culture.”12 Hence, “[b]oth property and
liberty,” surely including copyright, “are held on such reasonable conditions as may be
imposed by the governing power of the [s]tate.”13 To be sure, the state’s exercise of such
police power inextricably implicates a close examination of “the safety, health, morals
and general welfare of the public.”14 The pluralistic nature of this examination, in turn,
begs the question of whether simply reducing normative deliberation to a monistic
calculus, such as the three-step test, will provide a desirable benchmark for evaluating the
validity of all copyright limitations. The following two questions are of paramount
importance when considering the desirability of supporting the three-step test’s recent
heyday.
First and foremost, is the three-step test a legitimate rule per se? Judging from a
textual reading of the three-step test, it is patently clear that the touchstone of the test is a
single rhetorical mode which deems copyright holders’ economic interests
unquestionably sacred and virtuous. Yet the rhetorical mode of this type would definitely
give rise to the concern that, by acting as merely the agents of copyright holders’ interest,
the architects of the three-step test might have swept matters concerning public interest
7
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 28.1, 31 Legal Instruments –
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
8
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
9
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
10
Ruth L. Okediji, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS AND PUBLIC
INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES , UNCTA-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 13-14 (2006) (“Any exercise of sovereign discretion that introduces a
limitation or exception to the reproduction right is automatically subject to appraisal under the three-step
test.”).
11
Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved.”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (“Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the
cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); UNCTAD-ICTSD,
Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 196 (2005) (“[Copyright] exceptions serve the purpose of
ensuring that the protection of exclusive rights in copyrighted works does not harm the public interest.”).
12
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1744 (1988).
13
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
14
Id.
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under the rug of their negotiating table. This places at risk the set of public interestoriented copyright limitations that have been traditionally adopted in national copyright
systems.15 When it comes to developing countries, “[a] central question is whether the
exemptions and limitations within the existing framework of international rules allow
developing countries to set the right balance in protecting copyright [while] addressing
their special development needs.”16 If the three-step test were indeed a copyright-holder
centered standard, its implementation would surely discourage developing countries’
initiatives to tap into copyrighted works to facilitate the realization of their development
agendas.
The second question concerns whether the three-step test is capable of creating a
dynamic, public-welfare oriented adaptation of the traditional copyright limitations,
which could be applied to the novel circumstances of copyright exploitation that is
facilitated by advances in digital technology. It seems that the expansion of the threestep test has been premised upon the notion that the more easily a copy can be made and
disseminated, the smaller the scope of copyright limitations should be. Indeed, the threestep test has acted as a catalyst for narrowing the scope of copyright limitations.17
Nonetheless, others take the stance that the ultimate value of technology and copyright
law lies in the well-being of the public at large, arguing that it is not necessary to shrink
the scope of copyright limitations in the context of digital technology. Given the myriad
opportunities for enhanced access to information and the flourishing of new business
models for exploiting copyrighted works,18 the limitations on copyright should be carved
out in a broad manner.19 Among the various proposals offered, the most powerful is the
alternative compensation system (ACS) invented by Professor William Fisher.20 To bring

15

Sarah E. Henry, The First International Challenge to U.S. Copyright Law: What Does the WTO Analysis
of 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) Mean to the Future of International Harmonization of Copyright Laws Under the
TRIPS Agreement?, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 301, 324 (2001) (arguing that the three-step test “may serve
to invalidate existing member nations’ exceptions, or to restrict their scope so much that the underlying
policy objectives are thwarted”).
16
COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 99 (2002) [hereinafter CIPR Report].
17
By relying upon the need to comply with the three-step test, the EU Copyright Directive points out that
“the scope of certain exceptions or limitations may have to be even more limited when it comes to certain
new uses of copyright works and other subject-matter.” See Directive 2001/29, Recital 44, 2001 O.J.
(L167) 10, 13 (EU) (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization
of Certain Aspects Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society) [hereinafter EU Copyright
Directive].
18
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U. S. 913, 965 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(pointing out that “lawful music downloading services – those that charge the customer for downloading
music and pay royalties to the copyright holder – have continued to grow and to produce substantial
revenue”).
19
See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2003); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 587 (2004) (arguing that copyright
law “might exempt noncommercial or at least small-scale noncommercial copying (private use) along with
transformative uses”); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1535, 1569 (2005) (suggesting that “the existing collection of narrow legislative exemptions for specified
users and uses of copyrighted works” should be expanded in the digital age).
20
See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004).
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this proposal to fruition, he suggests that a new list of broad-based copyright limitations
should be added into national and international copyright law.21
¶7
This article argues that the inquiry into the legitimacy of the three-step test affords
the very vehicle through which all the aforementioned questions could be reconsidered in
a critical way. Based on an analysis of the relevant problems underlying this rule, I
contend that the three-step test, as the final arbiter of the validity of copyright limitations,
has gone too far in shielding the sanctity of copyrights. As I will demonstrate, the threestep test reeks of fundamental misconceptions, unfounded absoluteness, and unnecessary
arbitrariness, making it the Achilles’ heel of the copyright regime. I therefore introduce a
proposal to reshape the three-step test.
¶8
To this end, Part II provides a historical review of how the three-step test, a rule
initially laid down to shield the reproduction right in the analog world, has been made
applicable to the whole bundle of exclusive rights provided for in the current multilateral
and bilateral copyright treaties and national copyright laws.
¶9
Part III demonstrates that the three-step test wields the power to strike down
copyright limitations that promote public interest. Based on the construction of the threestep test rendered by the WTO Panel Report on Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
this Part first elucidates the nature and scope of each condition set out in the three-step
test and shows how the test might be applied in measuring the legality of copyright
limitations. It then demonstrates that the copyright limitations made vulnerable by the
three-step test include the U.S. fair use doctrine, the copyright misuse doctrine, the U.K.
public interest defense, and the private use exemption and reverse engineering exemption
available in almost all jurisdictions.
¶10
Based upon the foregoing exploration of the nature and scope of the three-step test,
Part IV encourages the “creative destruction”22 approach, in order to reconstruct this
standard in a manner conducive to the promotion and protection of the public interest. It
is suggested that the three-step test should be replaced by a new test that would fully
integrate public interest into its ambit: “Members may provide limitations on the
exclusive rights, provided that such limitations take account of the legitimate interests of
right holders and of third parties.”
¶11
More importantly, the reshaping of the three-step test, as I will argue in Part IV,
necessitates a careful re-examination of the conventional wisdom of copyright law in
general and the nature of copyright limitations in particular. This examination will
inquire into how we might re-imagine the legal status of users in the field of copyright
law and whether right holders should take on certain social responsibilities such as a quid
pro quo for being granted exclusive rights. In this sense, the inquiry into how we could
reshape the three-step test also provides a window on the potential alterations to the
traditional theoretical and structural landscape of copyright law.

21

See id. at 246-49.
According to Schumpeter, “creative destruction” is the process of industrial transformation that
accompanies radical innovation. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
81-86 (1976).
22
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II. UNIVERSALIZING THE THREE-STEP TEST: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. At the International Level
1. Berne Convention
¶12

The 1967 WIPO Stockholm Conference, aimed at revising the Berne Convention,
planted the seed of the three-step test. Prior to the Stockholm Conference, the right of
reproduction, although recognized as the most fundamental right accorded to authors,
was not expressly provided for in the Berne Convention.23 This loophole resulted in a
conundrum for international copyright protection, because Berne Union members “were
free to impose whatever restrictions they wished on reproduction rights, or even to deny
protection altogether.”24 High on the agenda of the Stockholm Conference, therefore,
was to set out a specific provision concerning the reproduction right in the Berne
Convention.25 Indeed, it was this effort that created the opportunity to usher the threestep test into the arena of international copyright law.
¶13
To bring this legislative agenda to fruition, the preparatory work for the Stockholm
Conference mapped out guidelines for modifying the Berne Convention with respect to
the right of reproduction. On the one hand, it was proposed that a broad-based
reproduction right be created to shield copyright holders’ economic interest.26 On the
other hand, the Conference recognized that “a satisfactory formula would have to be
found for the inevitable exceptions to this right.”27 To these ends, the Study Group
commissioned by the Conference submitted that the new provision should entail a
sweeping definition of the reproduction right integrated with a general benchmark for
allowable limitations. Accordingly, the proposed provision stated that “it should be a
matter for legislation in countries of the Union, having regard to the provisions of this
Convention, to limit the recognition and the exercising of [reproduction] right, for
specified purposes and on the condition that these purposes should not enter into
economic competition with [the] works.”28 This proposal is the precursor of the threestep test.
¶14
As the pre-Conference discussions proceeded, the variety of preexisting limitations
on the reproduction right provided for in national copyright laws29 made it difficult to
23

See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS 369-70 (1987).
24
WIPO, Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment,
WIPO Doc. SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003), at 20.
25
See WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11-Jul. 14, 1967, Report
on the Work of Main Committee I, ¶ 67 (1971) (“The Programme proposed that a general right of
reproduction should be recognized in Article 9(1).”) [hereinafter Stockholm Records].
26
Id. at 111 (“[I]t was obvious that all the forms of exploiting a work which had, or were likely to acquire,
considerable economic or practical importance must in principle be reserved to the authors.”).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 112.
29
See WIPO, Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Environment,
supra note 24, at 20 (“In practice, reproduction rights were universally recognized under national
legislation, but the exceptions to these rights varied considerably from country to country.”). The Study
Group’s report concluded that the then prevalent limitations “most frequently recognized in domestic laws”
pertained to the following works or methods of use: (1) public speeches; (2) quotations; (3) school books
and chrestomathies; (4) newspaper articles; (5) reporting current events; (6) ephemeral recordings; (7)
private use; (8) reproduction by photocopying in libraries; (9) reproduction in special characters for the use
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design a uniform rule that would govern the imposition of limitations. The 1965
Committee of Governmental Experts, after careful scrutiny, suggested a somewhat
different provision that would be presented at the Stockholm Conference. The draft
provision provided that:
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention
shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these
works, in any manner or form.
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to
permit the reproduction of such works
(a) for private use;
(b) for judicial or administrative purposes;
(c) in certain particular cases where the reproduction is not contrary to
the legitimate interests of the author and does not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work.30
¶15

Compared with the Study Group’s suggestion, the above proposal embraced a
stricter test with the inclusion of an additional benchmark – “not contrary to the
legitimate interests of the author.”31 At the same time, it explicitly itemized, as shown
above, two kinds of specific limitations that were allowed to be carved out in national
copyright laws. This proposal, however, was not deemed fully tailored to the varied
needs of participating countries at the Conference, leading to a bitter dispute over how it
could be reformulated. Generally speaking, there were three types of proposals that were
considered at the Stockholm Conference:


To restrict the specific limitations set forth in the draft provision.
For example, the French delegation suggested that the expression
“private use” be replaced by “individual or family use.”32 The
proposal of this type was made by a wide range of delegations,
including Germany,33 Italy,34 and the Netherlands.35



To extend the scope of the permissible limitations set forth in the
draft provision. This proposal was made by India,36 Rumania,37

of the blind; (10) sound recordings of literary works for the use of the blind; (11) texts of songs; (12)
sculptures on permanent display in public places, etc; (13) artistic works used as a background in films and
television programs; (14) reproduction in the interests of public safety. Stockholm Records, supra note 25,
at 112 n.12.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. ¶ 79.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
The Indian delegation proposed that the following paragraph should be inserted into the second part of
the draft provision: “in cases not covered by (a), (b) or (c) above, on payment of such remuneration which,
in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority.” See Stockholm Records, supra note
25, ¶ 80.
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and South Africa,38 in order to open the door for countries to
impose compulsory licenses on the reproduction right.
Particularly, the Indian delegation forcefully argued that the
provision of compulsory licensing would promote “public
interest”39 and prevent “the growth of monopolies and the creation
of obstacles to the spread of knowledge and culture.”40


¶16

To narrow the scope of the permissible limitations set forth in the
draft provision. The United Kingdom held the position that the
specific limitations listed in the draft provision should be
eliminated and the possible limitations adopted by countries should
be circumscribed by their proposed test – “ in certain special cases
where the reproduction does not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the authors.”41

In the midst of this vehement debate, it seemed that the U.K. proposal evinced the
capability of “embrac[ing] all possible exceptions within a single generalized
exception,”42 and therefore won the full support of the Main Committee of the
Conference.43 This gave birth to Article 9 (2) of the Berne Convention which is now
widely referred to as the three-step test:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit
the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.

¶17

In the context of the Berne Convention, it is self-evident that the three-step test is
designed to be applicable only to limitations on the right of reproduction.44 Therefore, it
does not create any parameters for carving out potential limitations on other categories of
economic rights, for example, the so-called minor reservations,45 nor does it apply to
37

See id.
Id. at 629 (“The use of words attached to a musical work should also be subject to a compulsory license
in paragraph (2) or local legislation should be permitted to provide for it.”).
39
See id. at 804.
40
See id. at 806.
41
Id. at 687. In addition, the Belgian delegation proposed that “[a] more restrictive formula should
therefore be sought for Article 9, paragraph (2)(c).”). Id. at 612. The Danish delegation made a similar
proposal. Id. at 615.
42
RICKETSON, supra note 23, at 481; see also MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, AND THE
THREE-STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW
51 (2004) (pointing out that the U.K. proposal was adopted owing to “its openness [and] the capacity to
encompass a wide range of exemptions and forms a proper basis for the reconciliation of contrary
opinions”).
43
Stockholm Records, supra note 25, ¶ 84 (“The Working Group decided to adopt the amendment proposed
by the United Kingdom, with some slight alterations in the English version.”).
44
Id. ¶ 78 (pointing out that Article 9(2) “contained the general exceptions to the right of reproduction”).
45
For an introduction to “minor reservations,” see SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND VOL. I 830-35 (2nd ed.
2006).
38
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moral rights under the Berne Convention.46 More importantly, the three-step test, as
shown by its negotiating history, does not govern the specific limitations on reproduction
rights that are scattered in various parts of the Berne Convention,47 including its
Appendix’s compulsory licensing provisions.
¶18
It should be noted that the three-step test, as its negotiating history shows, is
founded upon the following twin objectives. First, it tacitly allows Berne signatories to
retain the limitations on reproduction rights that they had carved out before the
Stockholm Conference. As the Study Group bluntly pointed out before the Stockholm
Conference, “it should not be forgotten that domestic laws already contained a series of
exceptions in favor of various public and cultural interests and that it would be vain to
suppose that countries would be ready at this stage to abolish these exceptions to any
appreciable extent.”48 Second, the three-step test expressly emphasizes the priority of
protecting the right holder’s economic interest. Although a moderate diversity of the
existing copyright limitations were accommodated, there was indeed a bottom line
underpinning the Berne Convention: the sustained operation of these limitations should
trump the right holder’s economic interest. Therefore, the three-step test directly
constrains Berne members’ powers to relax the standards for users to avail themselves of
these limitations or to carve out any new limitations.
2. TRIPs Agreement
¶19

Despite the WIPO’s strenuous efforts to improve the international intellectual
property system since its inception, a string of treaties administered by this organization
has lacked the teeth to provide comprehensive and up-to-date minimum standards for the
protection and, in particular, the enforcement of intellectual property at an international
level. At the same time, as many developed countries marched toward knowledge-based
economies, intellectual property gradually became the pivot of their increased global
competitiveness. The confluence of these factors gathered the very momentum of
integrating intellectual property as an indispensable part of the new international trade
regime wrought by the Uruguay Round of multinational trade negotiation. After seven
years of bargaining, the TRIPs Agreement ushered in brand-new building blocks for the
international protection of intellectual property which are parallel to the WIPO
mechanism.
¶20
The culmination of the TRIPs Agreement achieved, among other things, a vast
expansion of the scope of the three-step test. Based upon some modifications of its
precursor contained in the Berne Convention,49 the three-step test became a universal
minimum standard governing the imposition of limitations on the protections of
copyright,50 trademarks,51 industrial designs,52 and patents.53
46

RICKETSON, supra note 23, at 489.
See Berne Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2bis(2), 10, 10bis & 13(1).
48
Stockholm Records, supra note 25, at 111-12.
49
For example, the range of the beneficiaries of the three-step test was expanded from “authors” under the
Berne Convention to “right holders” under the TRIPs Agreement. The latter concept is generally broader
than the former.
50
Agreement on Trade-Related Agreements of Intellectual Property Rights art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
47
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In the sphere of copyright, looming large over the discussion of how to incorporate
the three-step test into the TRIPs Agreement was the proposal to constrain the application
of compulsory licensing. For example, the Brussels Draft, in addition to the three-step
test, provided that “[t]ranslation and reproduction licenses permitted under the Appendix
to the Berne Convention (1971) shall not be granted where the legitimate local needs of a
Party could be met by voluntary actions of right holders but for obstacles resulting from
measures taken by the government of that Party.”54 Moreover, the July 1990 Draft
expressly prohibited the granting of compulsory licenses for private use of computer
software, set out new conditions for invoking compulsory licensing under the Berne
Appendix, and emphasized the need of creating a new mechanism aimed at ensuring
prompt payment of licensing fees.55 However, all these additional limitations were
abandoned at the final stage of adopting the TRIPS Agreement,56 leading to direct
inclusion of the three-step test into Article 13 which provides that:
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to
certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of
the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder.57

¶22

The three-step test’s expansion facilitated by the TRIPs Agreement has profound
implications for the strengthening of copyright protection. First and foremost, the threestep test becomes applicable to the whole bundle of the exclusive economic rights vested
in authors, including the rental right, a new right set forth in the TRIPs Agreement. The
architecture of the TRIPs Agreement is based on the Berne Convention. By
incorporating the Berne Convention,58 the TRIPs Agreement mandates that all limitations
eroding authors’ exclusive economic rights under the Berne Convention and TRIPs
Agreement should be subject to the three-step test. In so doing, the TRIPs Agreement
sets additional parameters for the imposition of limitations not governed by Article 9(2)
dealing only with the reproduction right. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the TRIPs
Agreement does not make the three-step test applicable to authors’ moral rights provided
for in the Berne Convention.59 Nor does it apply to the economic rights vested in
performers, phonogram producers and broadcasting organizations under the TRIPs
Agreement60 and the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations.61

51

Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 26.2.
53
Id. art. 30.
54
See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 88 (2003).
55
Id. at 89.
56
Id. at 90-91.
57
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 50, art. 13.
58
Id. art. 9.1
59
Id.
60
Id. art. 14.6.
61
Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
52
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Second, drawing upon the rules set out in international trade law, the TRIPs
Agreement puts teeth into the three-step test. First, the combination of the most-favorednation treatment62 and the national treatment63 prohibits any discriminatory standards that
impose limitations upon copyrights on the basis of right holders’ geographic locations.
This increases the possibility of harmonizing the copyright limitations carved out in
national copyright laws. Second, the notification and review mechanisms are set up to
keep the TRIPs Council informed of the changes made to members’ national laws and
regulations64 and to enable the TRIPs Council to review their potential compatibility with
the Agreement.65 These procedures definitely enhance the transparency of national
legislation with respect to copyright limitations and of the ways in which they are
enforced. Third, and most importantly, the trade dispute settlement mechanism can order
a member to modify or repeal any given limitation on copyright provided that a violation
of the three-step test is found. This fosters increased compliance with the test and
provides the very dynamics to the copyright regime under the TRIPs Agreement.
3. WCT and WPPT

¶24

The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a flurry of unprecedented
advances in digital technology, whose power has revolutionized the conventional way of
exploiting works and has, in turn, rocked the very foundation of copyright protection and
enforcement in the analog world. In the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations on the
TRIPS Agreement, no forward-looking heed was paid to cope with the potential
challenge posed by digital technology to the protection and enforcement of copyright.
Therefore, digital copyright protection is not specifically addressed by the TRIPs
Agreement. On the other hand, the very fear of being marginalized by the WTO in the
arena of international protection of intellectual property pushed the WIPO to tap into the
new treaty-making opportunities to regain its status as the premier global intellectual
property regime. The culmination of the WCT and WPPT at the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic
Conference that convened in Geneva generally brought the international copyright law on
par with the developments in digital technology. In so doing, the WCT and WPPT
mainly set out provisions protecting the new right of making available,66 and the use of
technological measures67 and rights management information68 by right holders.
¶25
Parallel to the issues associated with the expansion of copyright protection was the
way in which the scope of copyright limitations could be readjusted. Because the threestep test had been incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement, it seemed undoubtedly
workable that this test should also be inserted into the then-proposed WCT and WPPT.69
Article 10 of the WCT provides that:
62

See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 50, art. 4.
See id. art. 3.
64
Id. arts. 63.2 & 63.3.
65
Id. art. 63.2.
66
Compare WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, U.S. Senate Treaty Doc. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65
[hereinafter WCT] with WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty arts.10 & 14, Dec. 20, 1996, U.S.
Senate Treaty Doc. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT].
67
Compare WCT, supra note 66, art. 11 with WPPT, supra note 66, art. 18.
68
Compare WCT, supra note 66, art. 12 with WPPT, supra note 66, art. 19.
69
WIPO, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the
63
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(1) Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for
limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and
artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author.
(2) Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention,
confine any limitations of or exceptions to rights provided for therein to
certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.70
¶26

At the same time, capitalizing on the three-step test, Article 16 of the WPPT
provides a similar provision. Taking account of the indentical language used in these two
provisions, the integration of the three-step test into the WCT and WPPT carries
significant ramifications for strengthening international protection of copyright.
¶27
To be sure, the inception of the WCT and WPPT represents the biggest leap
forward in expanding the scope of the three-step test. First, akin to the TRIPs
Agreement, the WCT and WPPT make the three-step test applicable to all the copyrights
originally provided for in the Berne Convention. Second, the three-step test targets any
limitations that constrain the exercise of the new economic rights (e.g. the right of
making available) as well as the broadened reproduction right under the WCT and
WPPT.71 Third, the WPPT, which partially updates the Rome Convention, incorporates
the three-step test as the check on members’ discretion in carving out limitations on the
economic rights vested in performers and phonogram producers. Hence, the three-step
test has, for the first time, entered the most entrepreneurial sphere of copyright law,
namely, the set of rights granted to performers, phonogram producers and broadcasting
organizations. Fourth, the three-step test has been channeled into the field of moral rights
protection afforded by the WCT and WPPT. Unlike the TRIPs Agreement, these two
treaties embrace an adequate protection of moral rights by simply connecting them to the
Berne Convention without expressly denying the need for moral rights protection72 or
setting out specific provisions for shielding right holders’ moral interests.73
¶28
The WCT and WPPT may have also facilitated the use of the three-step test to
evaluate any limitations on the protection of technological measures. At the 1996
Diplomatic Conference, the delegation from Singapore, for example, raised the question
of whether the three-step test could be applicable to the limitations on the protection of

Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference (1996), at ¶
12.04, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 (Dec. 2-20, 1996) (“The conditions of Article 9(2) of the Berne
Convention concerning the right of reproduction have been incorporated in Article 13 of the TRIPS
Agreement as general principles governing limitations of and exceptions to rights.”).
70
WCT, supra note 66, art. 10.
71
Under the WCT and WPPT, copies in digital form are brought into the scope of the scope reproduction
right. See, e.g., Agreed Statement Concerning Article 1(4) of the WCT, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/statements.html.
72
See, e.g., WCT, supra note 66, art. 1(2) (stating that “Nothing in this Treaty shall derogate from existing
obligations that Contracting Parties have to each other” under the Berne Convention).
73
Id. art. 11bis 1(2); WPPT, supra note 66, art. 5.
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technological measures.74 But it seemed this concern did not attract the attention of other
participating delegations and therefore no clear response was made at the Conference.
One might argue that the general structure of the WCT and WPPT implies that no such
application is allowed. This is because the provisions containing the test are put before
those associated with the protection of technological measures. Yet, one can reach the
contrary conclusion based on the spirit of the treaty, which attaches great importance to
the effective and adequate protection of digital copyright.75 Against this backdrop, it
seems that the scope of the three-step test in this respect hinges upon how the nature of
legal protection of technological measures is perceived. If one thinks that this form of
protection confers a new exclusive right upon creators76 or provides a new cause for filing
an action,77 the three-step test can certainly come into play. Conversely, if one sees it as
granting a paracopyright,78 the result would be different because the three-step test can
and should be applied only within the sphere of pure “copyrights” provided in the WCT
and WPPT.
B. At the Regional and National Levels
¶29

Interestingly, the expansion of the three-step test at the international level has
triggered a rapid incorporation of this test into regional and national copyright treaties or
laws so as to strengthen copyright protection in the digital age.
1. NAFTA

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)79 for the first time built a
systematic framework for intellectual property protection under regional trade agreement.
On the one hand, the inception of NAFTA gave the momentum to the final conclusion of
the TRIPs Agreement. On the other hand, as NAFTA provides broader protection of
intellectual property than the TRIPs Agreement: it laid the foundation for setting up
TRIPs-plus standards in the future free trade agreements.
¶31
Not surprisingly, the three-step test was incorporated into NAFTA’s copyright
provisions.80 Since NAFTA is a trade agreement, its inclusion of the three-step test

¶30

74

For example, the Singapore delegation pointed out that there was a need to clarify whether the three-step
test would apply to the protection of technological measures. See Stockholm Records, supra note 25, at
705.
75
The Preamble of the WCT, for example, states the need of “emphasizing the outstanding significance of
copyright protection as an incentive for literary and artistic creation” in the digital age. WCT pmbl., supra
note 66.
76
See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access
Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113 (2003).
77
See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (concluding
that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions “introduce new grounds for liability in the context of the
unauthorized access of copyrighted material.”); see also Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v
Ball, [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch.) (ruling that the anti-circumvention law “creates a tort of strict liability”).
78
Some commentators hold that a paracopyright, anti-circumvention right, has been set up through the
legislation like the DMCA. Targeting to control access to works, this new right has drastically altered the
landscape of copyright law, by superseding many forms of traditional copyright protection. See Dan L.
Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1096-1110 (2003).
79
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
80
See id. arts. 1705.5 & 1706.3.
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produces the same results as the TRIPs Agreement. However, the scope of the exclusive
rights provided in NAFTA is broader than that of the TRIPs Agreement. The three-step
test under NAFTA, therefore, governs the imposition of limitations on the exclusive
rights that are not prescribed in the TRIPS Agreement, e.g. the right of importation.81
2. European Union
¶32

In 2001, the EU adopted the Directive on Harmonization of Certain Aspects
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society82 aimed at enhancing the
copyright harmonization and implementing the WCT and WPPT within the EU
members.83 One of the Directive’s striking features is its enumeration of copyright
limitations that may be carved out in each EU member’s domestic copyright law. First,
the Directive itemizes an exhaustive string of the specific limitations on copyright.84
Second, the Directive expressly prescribes that the three-step test governs the imposition
of these limitation in EU members’ domestic law.85 Third, it channels the three-step test
into86 the Directive on Rental and Lending Rights.87
¶33
The inclusion of the three-step test into the EU Copyright Directive represents a
leap forward in sharpening the three-step test’s power. Unlike NAFTA, the Directive
taps into the three-step test’s potential to constrain national legislative power that may
curtail digital copyright.88 More importantly, the Directive encourages domestic courts in
EU members to directly invoke the three-step test when dealing with any disputes
associated with copyright limitations.89 Currently, courts in the Netherlands90 and
France91 have directly applied the three-step test.

81

Under NAFTA, right holders have the right to authorize or prohibit “the importation into the Party’s
territory of copies of the work made without the right holder’s authorization.” NAFTA, supra note 79, art.
1705.2(a). This right, however, is not provided for in the TRIPs Agreement. See TRIPs Agreement, supra
note 50, art. 6.
82
See EU Copyright Directive, supra note 17.
83
Id. pmbl. ¶¶ 1-15.
84
Id. arts. 5.1-5.4.
85
See id. art. 5.5.
86
See id. art. 11.1(b).
87
Council Directive 92/100/EEC, Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to
Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, art. 10, 1992 O.J. (L. 346).
88
See Jo Oliver, Copyright in the WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three-Step Test, 25 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 119, 138 (2002) (“[T]here is evidence that intention of the EC Directive is to further restrict existing
exceptions, both at the level of EC law and the law of member states.”).
89
Id. at 139 (“The wording in [the Directive’s three-step test] is different and appears to refer to the
application of the exceptions to an actual case, presumably by a domestic court.”).
90
De Nederlandse Dagbladpers/Netherlands, Court of the Hague, 2 March 2005, Case No. 192880 (Neth.),
¶ 15 (holding that copyright limitation carved out in Dutch copyright law should be in line with the threestep test).
91
Cass.1e civ., Feb. 28, 2006, Bull civ. I, No. 824. For a comment on the decision as it stood before the
Court de cassation quashed the motion, see Christophe Geiger, The Private Copy Exception, an Area of
Freedom (Temporarily) Preserved in the Digital Environment, 37 IIC; INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 74 (2006).
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3. FTA
¶34

The past couple of years have seen a proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs)
that enhance intellectual property protection at the regional or bilateral level. Generally
speaking, the U.S. has played a leading role in capitalizing on FTAs so as to ratchet up
standards for copyright protection and enforcement. On the other hand, the U.S. has been
confronted with the intense pressure from the international campaign against stringent
intellectual property (IP) standards led by developing countries and NGOs.92 As an
alternative to a multilateralism approach to copyright protection, the bilateralism
approach provides the most efficient vehicle with which the U.S. can exert the maximum
leverage to create higher IP standards than those set forth in the TRIPs Agreement and
WIPO Treaties 1996.
¶35
Although strategy of this type was utilized a couple of years ago,93 it was not until
the recent proliferation of FTAs concluded between the U.S. and her trading partners,
including Singapore, Chile, Australia, Central American countries, and Morocco, that the
far-reaching and stringent standards for IP protection and enforcement have been
formally created.
¶36
Not surprisingly, the three-step test has been inserted in these FTAs, all of which
are solely designed for the protection of digital copyright. By tapping into the
convergence of authors’ rights and related/neighboring rights and the simplified
entitlements vested in right holders, these recently-concluded FTAs significantly simplify
the legal framework for copyright protection. Drawing upon the WCT and WPPT,
copyright provisions set out in the FTAs primarily deals with the cluster of exclusive
rights that are core to the protection of copyright in the digital environment, including the
rights of reproduction,94 communication to the public,95 and distribution.96 Therefore, the
three-step test governs the scope of the limitations that can be carved out on these rights
enjoyed by authors, performers and phonogram producers. More importantly, FTAs set
forth WCT and WPPT-plus standards. For example, it is mandated that temporary copies
should be protected in the member states.
4. China
¶37

The recently overhauled Chinese copyright law marks the first time that the threestep test has been embedded into the letters of municipal copyright law. The Regulations
for the Implementation of the Copyright Law, revised in 2002, introduces a quasi threestep test aimed at providing guidance to courts in considering the legality of the use of
92

This backlash can be epitomized by the recent campaign that sought to provide an increased access to
patented drugs for the least-developed countries. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The
TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L
L. 1, 42-45 (2004) (providing an overview of the major international events that contributed to the adoption
of the Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health).
93
The U.S. and Jordan entered into a free trade agreement in 2000. This FTA, however, does not establish
the basic framework for digital copyright protection as comprehensively as those contained in its progenies
concluded in 2003 and 2004 respectively.
94
See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.4.1, May 6, 2003, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Section_Index.html [hereinafter
Singapore FTA].
95
Id. art. 16.4.2.
96
Id. art. 16.4.3.
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limitations permitted by the Copyright Law 2001. Pursuant to Article 21 of the
Copyright Regulations 2002, the use of published works on the grounds of fair dealing
exemptions or compulsory licenses should neither “conflict with the normal exploitation
of the work” nor “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.” 97 In
light of the fact that the Copyright Law 2001 embraces a closed list of limitations and
specifies the circumstances in which the public can use the works, the limitations are
generally formulated in a manner compatible with first condition of the three-step test,
namely “in certain special cases.”98
C. Summary
¶38

This Part sketched the trajectory of the expansion of the three-step test in the realm
of the international, regional and national copyright laws. What has been ushered in is
the transformation of the three-step test from a rule applied in the narrow sphere of the
reproduction right into a core standard governing the manner in which limitations on
various categories of copyrights could be carved out. Throughout this transformation
process, the architects of copyright law, however, have been preoccupied with the notion
that copyright law should be shaped as a utilitarian instrument aimed at solely protecting
copyright holders’ interests.
III. THREE-STEP TEST’S CHILLING EFFECTS

¶39

In this Part, I consider whether the three-step test wields the power to strike down
certain public interest-oriented limitations on copyright. The WTO Panel Report on
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act99 marks the first time the international
adjudicative body has interpreted the three-step test.100 The Panel Report elucidates the
nature and scope of the three-step test and provides insightful guidance to how the test
could be applied in measuring the legality of copyright limitations. This Part, therefore,
first considers whether the copyright limitations selected below, for example the fair use
doctrine, can meet the conditions set out in the three-step test. Moreover, this inquiry
only examines the validity of a selected limitation on copyright by comparing it with only
one condition set forth in the three-step test. This is because the three-step test is applied
in a cumulative manner and thus the violation of any condition set forth therein would
result in invalidation of the copyright limitation concerned.

97

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquanfa Zhishi Tiaoli [Implementing Regulations of the Copyright
Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 21 (promulgated by Premier Zhu Rongji, Aug. 2, 2002,
effective Aug. 15, 2002).
98
See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 50, art. 13.
99
See Panel Report, supra note 3 (in this dispute, the EU claimed that § 110(5)(A)-(B) of the U.S.
Copyright Act violated, inter alia, Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement, namely the three-step test).
100
See Jane Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the Three
Step Test for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3, 5 (2001).
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A. The First Prong
1. Its Nature and Scope
¶40

The first part of the three-step test mandates that the limitations on copyright shall
be “confined to certain special cases.”101 According to the Panel Report, this condition
implicates the following three elements as essential. First, limitations on copyright
provided for in national legislation should be “clearly defined.”102 This requirement
“guarantees a sufficient degree of legal certainty.”103 Nonetheless, it is not necessary for
national legislation to “identify explicitly each and every possible situation to which the
exception could apply, provided that the scope of the exception is known and
particularized.”104
¶41
Second, a limitation on copyright should also be “narrow in its scope and reach.”105
This means a limitation “must be limited in its field of application or exceptional in its
scope.”106 Put differently, in order to guarantee a sufficient degree of legal certainty, a
limitation should be maintained in a quantitatively and qualitatively narrow way.107
¶42
Third, the examination of public policies underlying a limitation is not a necessary
part of the inquiry into whether the first condition of the three-step test is met.108 A
finding that the abovementioned two requirements are met will suffice to show a given
limitation’s compliance with the first prong of the three-step test, even if no public policy
underlying the limitation in question can be discerned.109 However, the avowed public
policy purpose embodied in the limitation “may be useful from a factual perspective for
making inferences about the scope of a limitation or exception or the clarity of its
definition.”110 This means that the public policy scrutiny is of “subsidiary relevance” to
the inquiry into whether the first condition of the three-step test is met. For example, the
Panel Report, after examining the public policy Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
concluded that its legislative history “indicate an intention of establishing an exception
with a narrow scope.”111
¶43
It seems that the first prong of the three-step test is construed by the Panel Report
in a correct way. Both the EU and the U.S., the two parties involved in the dispute,
admitted that a copyright limitation must be “clearly defined and narrow in its scope and
reach” in order to achieve the full compliance with first condition.112 Moreover, the Panel
101

See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 50, art. 13.
Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.108 & ¶ 6.112.
103
Id. ¶ 6.108.
104
Id.
105
Id. ¶ 6.109 & ¶ 6.112.
106
Id. ¶ 6.109.
107
Id. ¶ 6.109 (“In other words, an exception or limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a
qualitative sense.”).
108
Id. ¶ 6.112 (“The wording of Article 13’s first condition does not imply passing a judgment on the
legitimacy of the exceptions in dispute.”).
109
Id. (pointing out that “a limitation or exception may be compatible with the first condition even if it
pursues a special purpose whose underlying legitimacy in a normative sense cannot be discerned.”).
110
Id.
111
Id. ¶ 6.157.
112
According to the Panel Report, the United States “acknowledges that the essence of the first condition is
that the exceptions be well-defined and of limited application.” See id. ¶ 6.103. With respect to the EU, it
is submitted that “an exception has to be well-defined and narrow in scope to meet the requirement under
102
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Report’s construction has won overwhelming support by commentators. For instance,
Jane Ginsburg argues that the first prong of the three-step test only accommodates
limitations that “are sufficiently narrow” and there is no need to pursue “normative
inquiry” into the underlying public policy.113 Sam Ricketson changed his original
position that the first prong entails the inquiry into “some reason of public policy.”114
After learning of the Panel Report’s construction, he now “find[s] it difficult and indeed,
unnecessary, to maintain [his] earlier interpretation of the expression ‘certain special
cases’ as requiring also that these have an underlying public policy justification.”115 The
Panel Report’s construction of the first prong of the three-step test appears reasonable.
2. Fair Use Doctrine
¶44

The condition that requires copyright limitations be “clearly defined” and “narrow
in scope and reach” calls into question whether the first prong of the three-step test will
strike down copyright limitations that are by nature flexible and open-ended. This
section examines whether the fair use doctrine is in line with the three-step test. To so
do, it first maps the nature and scope of the fair use doctrine as codified in section 107 of
the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. It then juxtaposes section 107 and relevant judicial
decisions with the first prong of the three-step test in order to show whether the fair use
doctrine is “clearly defined” and “narrow in scope and reach.”
i)

Nature and Scope of the Fair Use Doctrine

a)

Purposes of Codification
¶45
First and foremost, the legislative purpose behind section 107 connotes that the
codification of the fair use doctrine is by no means intended to shape the finely-grained
contours of the doctrine.
¶46
Historically, the fair use doctrine was first announced in U.S. copyright law by
Folsom v. Marsh,116 a decision written by Justice Story in 1841. Since then, gallons of
ink in a host of cases have been devoted to delineating the proper contours of this
doctrine.117 Over one hundred years of judicial development and commentary on the
nature of the fair use doctrine, however, has not produced a consistent and clear-cut
definition of the doctrine,118 giving rise to a “long controversy over the related problems
of fair use . . . .”119 It was not until 1976 that this judicially-made doctrine was given
express statutory recognition in the U.S. Copyright Act. Obviously, the codification
the first condition.” See id. ¶ 6.104.
113
Ginsburg, supra note 97.
114
RICKETSON, supra note 23, at 482.
115
SAM RICKETSON, THE THREE-STEP TEST, DEEMED QUANTITIES, LIBRARIES AND CLOSED EXCEPTIONS 31
(2002).
116
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
550 (1985) (“As early as 1841, Justice Story gave judicial recognition to the [fair use] doctrine . . . .”).
117
For an examination of these cases, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
19-63 (2d ed. 1995).
118
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5109, 5679 (“Although the
courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the
concept has ever emerged.”).
119
Id. at 66.
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aimed to dispel the discrepancies in the judicial construction of the fair use doctrine so as
to inject some degree of certainty and predictability into its application.120
While the codification was indeed imbued with the aforementioned ambition,
Congress nevertheless did not intend to shape the fair use doctrine as “bright-line
rules”121 governing the resolution of all the tricky problems that are likely to cloud the
judicial ruling. The reasons why Congress preserved the malleability of the doctrine are
twofold.
First and foremost, the fair use doctrine is seen as “an equitable rule of reason.”122
Thus, it is impossible to render a “generally applicable definition,” given that “each case
raising the question must be decided on its own facts.”123
Second, the fair use doctrine is also regarded as an embodiment of “law and
fact.”124 As a panacea for evaluating the lawfulness of the use of works, the doctrine per
se should be capable of dealing with an ocean of different circumstances under which the
access to and use of works are achieved. Therefore, “the endless variety of situations and
combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases precludes the formulation
of exact rules in the statute.”125
The combination of these two factors led the Congress to shy away from proffering
a finely-grained definition of the fair use doctrine.126 On the one hand, section 107 was
supposed to itemize merely the relevant factors gleaned from prior judicial experience
dealing with fair use issues.127 In this sense, the codification was not intended to “change,
narrow, or enlarge [the doctrine] in any way.”128 At the same time, a parallel objective of
the codification was to make the wording of section 107 flexible and broad enough to
confer upon courts the considerable discretion to “adapt the doctrine to particular
situations on a case-by-case basis.”129 On this basis, section 107 is designed to work in
tandem with the judiciary so as to accommodate new technological innovations.130
120

Id. at 65-66 (pointing out that the criteria for deciding fair use had been “stated in various ways” by the
pre-1976 courts and section 107 “offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the
doctrine apply.”).
121
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31 (1984) (noting that
Congress had “eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach to fair use”); Sony’s opinion in this respect has been
consistently endorsed by the Supreme Court’s decisions pertaining to fair use. See, e.g., Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 588; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (pointing out that “[t]he
task [of section 107] is not to be simplified with bright-line rules . . . .”). See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A] (13-159) (arguing that nothing in section 107
provides “a rule that may automatically be applied in deciding whether any particular use is ‘fair’”).
122
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 118. This vision of the fair use doctrine has been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court’s decisions. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 448; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588.
123
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 118. See also Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130,
144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“The doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition.”);
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1597
(2004) (arguing that “the ‘equitable’ nature of the doctrine renders it incapable of precise definition . . . .”).
124
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.”); NIMMER, supra note
121, § 13.05[A] (13-159) (“Fair use is said to constitute a mixed issue of law and fact, but what facts will
be sufficient to raise this defense in any given case is not easily answered.”).
125
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 118, at 66.
126
See NIMMER, supra note 121, § 13.05[A] (13-158) (“Section 107 does not attempt to define ‘fair use.’”).
127
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (“The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright
Act reflects the intent of the Congress to codify the common-law doctrine.”).
128
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 118, at 66.
129
Id. (emphasis added); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31 (1984)
(citing House Report); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (“The drafters resisted pressures from special
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b)

Structure of Codification
¶51
Informed by the aforementioned legislative purpose of codifying the fair use
doctrine, the structure of section 107 is inevitably shaped in a flexible and open-ended
manner. On the one hand, the list of the specific examples of presumptively fair use, i.e.
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research,131 is ostensibly
non-exhaustive.132 This is because Congress intended to preserve the broad and factspecific nature of the fair use doctrine133 while also directing the courts to base their fair
use analyses on the consideration of the four factors listed in the other part of section
107.134
¶52
Moreover, section 107 tacitly allows courts to instill into their fair use analyses any
relevant factors other than the four specifically listed in section 107. In doing so, it does
not provide any hint on the benchmark with which courts can channel additional factors
into the fair use analysis. Hence, ample latitude has been left to courts to decide that
other relevant factors can be brought in play. To date, courts have considered “public
benefit,”135 “First Amendment,”136 and the way in which the defendant use the allegedly
infringing work137 as additional factors.
c)

Application of Four Factors
¶53
The inconsistencies in the courts’ constructions of the four factors itemized in
section 107 further heighten the ambiguity that surrounds the fair use doctrine.
1)
The First Factor
¶54
The first factor directs courts to consider the purpose and character of the
secondary use. In this respect, courts routinely weigh by either of the two criteria –
interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirmative
defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577
(1994) (holding that the task of the codification “like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case
analysis.”).
130
Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 448 n.31 (“The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the
judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially in a
period of rapid technological change.”).
131
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
132
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561 (“This listing was not intended to be exhaustive, or to single out any
particular use as presumptively a ‘fair’ use.”) (citation omitted); NIMMER, supra note 121, at 13-159.
133
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (“Congress resisted attempts to narrow the ambit of this traditional enquiry
by adopting categories of presumptively fair use, and it urged courts to preserve the breadth of their
traditionally ample view of the universe of relevant evidence.”).
134
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
135
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (pointing out that
the conclusion that time-shifting is fair use is “buttressed by the fact that to the extent time-shifting expands
public access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits.” ); Mattel Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding fair use based partially upon the policy that
“the public benefit in allowing artistic creativity and social criticism to flourish is great.”).
136
Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding that “it is
highly significant to the scope of fair use that plaintiff accepted public funds to support his artwork. This
fact broadens the scope of the fair use exemption because of the strong public interest, protected by the
First Amendment, in free criticism of the expenditure of federal funds.”).
137
See DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (“In
addition to the four factors necessarily considered in a determination of fair use, the Court considers a fifth
factor. There is a difference between works that incidentally parody other works while creating a genuinely
distinct product and those that comprise little more than an adaptation of another’s original work.”).
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whether the allegedly infringing copies are made for a commercial or noncommercial use
and whether copies serve a transformative purpose. In some cases, the defendant’s state
of mind has also been taken into account. In considering these sub-factors, however,
courts have not dispelled any “murky waters” lingering in this area of their fair use
analyses.
(i)
The Commercial/Noncommercial Distinction
¶55
With respect to nature of commercial purpose, Harper & Row and its progeny
center their inquiries on “whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”138 Therefore, a user’s indirect
profit-making motivation,139 including the purposes of gaining illegitimate cost-saving,140
as well as recognition among his peers and authorship credit,141 is sufficient to prove the
commercial nature of the use. Alternatively, Sony viewed direct profit-making
motivation as the only key factor for drawing the dividing line between the commercial
or noncommercial use of works, rejecting the analogy of “jewel theft”142 which lends
support to the Harper & Row approach.143
¶56
Regarding the extent to which the commerciality factor can determine the outcome
of fair use analysis, Sony144 and Harper & Row145 held that any commercial use of works
ought to be regarded as “presumptively unfair.” A series of later decisions,146 including
138

471 U.S. at 562.
See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Direct economic
benefit is not required to demonstrate a commercial use. Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of
copyrighted works, even if the copies are not offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use.”); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 890 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the commerciality factor
disfavors the defendant because it “reaps at least some indirect economic advantage from its photocopying
[scholarly articles].”).
140
A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1015 (“[C]ommercial use is demonstrated by a showing that repeated and
exploitative unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing
authorized copies.”). See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that a church that copied religious text for its members is commercial use because it
gains an advantage or benefit at no cost, e.g. the increase in the number of church members).
141
Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Particularly in an academic setting, profit
is ill-measured in dollars. Instead, what is valuable is recognition because it so often influences
professional advancement and academic tenure. The absence of a dollars and cents profit does not
inevitably lead to a finding of fair use.”).
142
This analogy was put forward by Professor Laurence Tribe, who argued that “jewel theft is not
converted into a noncommercial veniality if stolen jewels are simply worn rather than sold.” See Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.33 (1984).
143
See id. (rejecting the argument that “consumptive uses of copyrights by home VTR users are
commercial even if the consumer does not sell the homemade tape because the consumer will not buy tapes
separately sold by the copyrightholder.”).
144
See id. at 451 (“[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation
of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright . . . .”).
145
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985) (“The fact that the
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor tending to weigh against a finding
of fair use.”).
146
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1552 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Even
assuming that the use had a purely commercial purpose, the presumption of unfairness can be rebutted by
the characteristics of the use.”); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that the commerciality factor is not controlling in the fair use analysis and “[t]he commercial
nature of a use is a matter of degree, not an absolute . . . .”); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding that “whether the profit element of the fair use calculus affects the ultimate determination of
whether there is a fair use depends on the totality of the factors considered . . . .”); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
139
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Campbell, however, did not accept this conclusion and contended that “hard evidentiary
presumption”147 of this type “would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble paragraph of § 107 . . . .”148 Furthermore, it was submitted that commercial or
noncommercial character of a work “is not conclusive,” and this factor shall be “weighed
along with others in fair use decisions.”149
(ii)
Transformative/Nontransformative Use Distinction
¶57
Whether the use of works is transformative in nature is reckoned as a crucial factor
in deciding a potential finding of fair use.150 Transformative use, according to Campbell,
consists of the acts of “add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or different
character, [and alteration of] the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”151 Yet,
Campbell did not articulate a benchmark for measuring the degree to which the use of
work is “transformative” enough to be regarded as fair use. The absence of such a
benchmark leads courts to swing between whether transformative use should be strictly
be confined to the direct alteration of the original work at issue152 – which adds
considerably new content to the original153 – or broadly include the use of work that
simply adds new purposes and characters to the original.154
(iii)

Defendant’s state of mind

Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992) (arguing that “the presumption of unfairness that arises
in [commercial use] cases can be rebutted by the characteristics of a particular commercial use.”); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 889 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding the undispositive nature of
the commerciality factor).
147
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 570 (1994).
148
Id. at 584. See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 492 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (drawing the same conclusion).
149
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
150
See id. at 569 (holding that “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism . . . .”); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 801-02
(9th Cir. 2003); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271-74 (11th Cir. 2001).
151
510 U.S. at 579.
152
See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2003)
(holding that “[t]o the extent that the character and purpose of the clip previews and the original full-length
films diverge . . . the clips share the same character and purpose as Disney’s derivative trailers.”); L.A.
News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Although defendants’
service does have a news reporting purpose, its use of the works was not very transformative. Reuters
copies footage and transmits it to news reporting organizations; Reuters does not explain the footage, edit
the content of the footage, or include editorial comment.”).
153
This view is based upon the holding of the Folsom v. Marsh which ruled that fair use “must be real,
substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not
merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the
original work.” 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (emphasis added). For the case which supports this
view in deal with transformative use issues, see L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d 924,
938-39 (concluding that it is not transformative use which does not add anything new to the original work
by citing Folsom v. Marsh). The court also asserted that Campbell confirms this standard. Id. at 939.
154
See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that displaying search
results as “thumbnail” version (much smaller, lower-resolution images) of copyrighted pictures by search
engine is transformative use, because it “serv[es] an entirely different function” from the copyright holder’s
original images).
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Swayed by the notion of “fairness” which underpins the fair use doctrine,155 Harper
& Row states that “[f]air use presupposes good faith and fair dealing,”156 making it
impossible for users with “unclean hands”157 to invoking fair use defense.158 On the
contrary, other courts have stated that bad faith is no bar to finding fair use. It is
suggested in Campbell that good faith should not be a factor in weighing fair use
defense.159 Following Campbell, the court in NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, held that
“[f]air play is no defense to infringement . . . bad faith should be no obstacle to fair
use.”160

2)
The Second Factor
¶59
The second factor listed in section 107 directs the courts to consider “the nature of
the copyrighted work.” It seems that this factor is less contentious. Courts routinely
examine two issues: whether the work is published or not and whether the work is factual
or creative.161
3)
The Third Factor
¶60
The third factor is the consideration of “the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” Although courts do not set up any
ceiling for the amount of taking, they divide with regard to the quantitative and
qualitative standards that are embraced for gauging the third factor.
¶61
As to the quantitative standard, first of all, there is split as to whether wholesale
copying would be allowed. Sony and some other decisions held that fair use can
accommodate verbatim copying of the entire work.162 In sharp contrast, guided by
Harper & Row,163 some courts have insisted that “[w]hile ‘wholesale copying does not
155
Judge Mansfield held that “[n]o court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an
immoral or an illegal act.” See Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp 341, 343 (1775). See also Time Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F.Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“Despite [exclusive] rights, the courts have
nonetheless recognized that copying or other appropriation of a copyrighted work will not entail liability if
it is reasonable or ‘fair’.”) (emphasis added).
156
471 U.S. at 562-63 (knowing exploitation of purloined manuscript not compatible with “good faith” and
“fair dealings” underpinnings of fair use doctrine.). See also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F. 2d 1171, 1175 (9th
Cir. 1983) (holding that “fair use presupposes that the defendant has acted fairly and in good faith . . . .”).
157
See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“Our conclusion that the fair use defense is unavailable to [the defendant] is bolstered by the equitable
considerations . . . .”); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(“To invoke the fair use exception, an individual must possess an authorized copy of a literary work.”)
(emphasis added).
158
Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137,
140 (1999) (observing that “it may be fair use to make nonprofit research photocopies of pages from a
lawfully acquired book; it is not fair use to steal the book in order to make the photocopies.”).
159
See 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994). See also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105, 1126-1127 (1990) (arguing that good faith is irrelevant to fair use analysis); Lloyd Weinreb,
Fair’s Fair: A Comment On The Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1147 (1990) (“The
utilitarian worth of the use, not the user’s motive, is all that matters so far as copyright is concerned . . . .”).
160
364 F.3d 471, 486 (2d Cir. 2004). This case indicates that a defendant’s bad faith could be altogether
ignored in the fair use analysis.
161
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1985).
162
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1984); Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1992); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
163
471 U.S. at 565.
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preclude fair use per se,’ copying an entire work ‘militates against a finding of fair
use.’”164 Moreover, the use of the quantitative standard has led to a further rift over the
permissible amount of taking in the case of parody. While near-verbatim copying of the
popular song “Pretty Woman”165 and the substantial appropriation of the famous novel
“Gone with the Wind”166 is allowed, copying of a well-known principal character of “the
Nightmare film series” into a music video is deemed too excessive to be within the limit
of the third factor.167 With respect to graphic images, wholesale copying of Barbie and
Mickey Mouse generates different legal consequences. While the former was deemed to
fall within the ambit of the third factor,168 the latter was not.169
¶62
On the other hand, swing positions as to the qualitative standard have appeared in
fair use decisions. It seems that the majority of court judgments are in agreement about
the inference that the qualitative standard, rather than the quantitative standard, governs
the third factor analysis.170 Accordingly, if the copied portion is unquestionably the heart
of the copyrighted work, even a small amount of copying would tilt the third factor
against the defendant.171 Some other courts, however, do not buy into this position. To
them, the near-verbatim copying as well as taking the heart of the work for parodic
purpose could be justified because parodists need to “conjure up” the original work.172 In
Campbell decision’s terms, “the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose
and character of the use.”173
4)

The Fourth Factor

164

Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2003).
165
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994) (“Parody’s humor, or in any event its
comment, necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imitation . . . .
When parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least
enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.”) (emphasis added).
166
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271-74 (11th Cir. 2001). By relying upon
Campbell, the court held that defendant’s taking of characters, plot and major scenes from Gone with the
Wind did not violated the third factor.
167
New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(“Because [the character copied] is a widely recognized major character in the Nightmare series, very little
would have been needed to bring the image of [the character at issue] and the Nightmare series into the
minds of the music video viewers.”).
168
See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003). In this case, the
defendant’s parody copied the Barbie figure and head. The court held that “[w]e do not require parodic
works to take the absolute minimum amount of the copyrighted work possible.” Id. at 804.
169
See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). In this case, the defendant
published two comic cartoon magazines entitled “Air Pirates Funnies”. They pictorially parodized Walt
Disney company’s cartoon characters like Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck as “as active members of a free
thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture.” Id. at 753. The court held that “By copying the
images in their entirety, defendants took more than was necessary to place firmly in the reader’s mind the
parodied work and those specific attributes that are to be satirized.” Id. at 758.
170
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 12:64 (3d ed. 2005) (arguing that “[q]ualitative measures
outweigh quantitative measures in determining the weight to be given the third factor.”).
171
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985).
172
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-89 (1994); Mattel Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 801-02 (9th Cir. 2003); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d
1257, 1271-74 (11th Cir. 2001).
173
510 U.S. at 586-87.
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¶63

The fourth factor begs the question of “effect of the use upon the potential market
for value of the copyrighted work.”174 The trajectory of judgments shows that no
principled way to analyze this factor has been produced by courts. Generally speaking,
courts’ decisions fall into four camps in the spectrum of their analysis: (1) far left; (2)
left; (3) center; and (4) right.175
¶64
The first two camps center upon the examination of the economic impact on
copyright holders’ current market rather than potential market or both. The “far left”
judgments chiefly rule that, even if the user enters into economic competition with the
copyright holder, no economic losses incurred on the latter can be assumed or
ascertained. This is because the fourth factor does not allow the right holder to weed out
the legitimate competition mounted by the user.176 On the other hand, the “left” group
decisions reckon that “[i]t is wrong to measure the detriment to plaintiff by loss of
presumed royalty income – a standard which necessarily assumes that plaintiff had a right
to issue licenses.”177 Therefore, the fourth factor scrutiny should be limited to the impact
on the current market.178
¶65
The “center” group decisions consider the economic impact on both the current and
potential markets, or the potential market alone. For example, Harper & Row holds that
the fourth factor inquiry “must take account not only of harm to the original but also of
harm to the market for derivative works.”179 With respect to the noncommercial use of
works, Sony centers upon the consideration of the impact on the potential market.180
According to this group of decisions, the inquiry into the “some meaningful likelihood of
future harm”181 is sufficient. Therefore, it seems that the right holder needs to
demonstrate that there is a very strong likelihood that the potential market will be
“traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed . . . .”182 A showing of only a tenuous
connection between the current and potential markets would not necessarily result in the
harm on the potential market. Nor can the potential market be presumed to exist.
¶66
The “right” group decisions envision that the harm to the potential market is the
core of the fourth factor inquiry. In Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v.
American Broadcasting,183 the Second Circuit held that the defendant’s copying and
subsequent broadcast of a small portion of a student-produced film biography of a
champion wrestler usurped an extremely significant market that was then controlled by
the defendant and other derivative market in which the plaintiff could license their film.184
Yet, before making such an inference, the court did not inquire into whether the plaintiff
had any intention to exploit the film in question through licensing agreement. Rather, it

174

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
In the following discussion, I simply summarize different judicial rulings on this issue, and the uses of
the terms, like “left” and “right,” have no political connotations.
176
See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1992).
177
See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
178
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 170, at 12:69.
179
471 U.S. at 568.
180
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (“What is necessary is a
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.”).
181
Id.
182
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 897 (2d Cir. 1994).
183
621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
184
Id. at 61.
175
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seems that the court assumes that once the work is finished, its derivative market does
necessarily exist. It seems that such an assumption has been tacitly accepted by UMG
Recordings v. MP3.com185 and L.A. Times v. Free Republic,186 in which the court did not
examine whether the plaintiffs had the intention to open up the derivative market
envisaged by the court before the suits were filed.
¶67

ii) Fair use within the context of the three-step test
Judging from section 107’s legislative purpose and structure and the discrepancies
in courts’ approaches to apply the four factors, the fair use doctrine is indeed vague,
flexible and open-ended. Not surprisingly, it has been lamented that “the issue of fair use
. . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright . . . .”187 and “[n]o doctrine in
copyright is less determinate than fair use.”188 This suggests the fair use doctrine is
incapable of acting as well-shaped radar “separating the fair use sheep from the
infringing goats . . . .”189 Therefore, the malleability of the fair use doctrine, as many
commentators have pointed out, runs sharply counter to the letter and spirit of the first
prong of the three-step test.190
3. Other Common-Law Defenses

¶68

The fair use doctrine’s violation of the first prong of the three-step test begs the
question of whether the uncodified common-law doctrines constraining the exercise of
copyright runs afoul of the first prong. As Justice Souter has pointed out, the
“[c]ommon-law method tends to pay respect instead to detail, seeking to understand old
principles afresh by new examples and new counterexamples.”191 Common-law doctrines
are generally flexible and open-ended in nature, and thereby are vulnerable to the threestep test challenge. As will be shown below, at stake are the copyright misuse doctrine
and public interest defense, two quintessential common-law doctrines available in both
the U.S. and U.K.

i) Copyright Misuse Doctrine
¶69
Compared with the long-entrenched fair use doctrine, the copyright misuse doctrine
is a relatively “young” defense aimed at neutralizing the monopolistic control of works
that may well run contrary to the promotion of public interest. Drawing upon the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands192 and the patent misuse doctrine,193 Lasercomb

185

92 F. Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1469-71 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
187
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
188
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 170, at 12:3.
189
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
190
See, e.g., Tyler G. Newby, Note, What’s Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair
Use Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1660 (1999); ROBERT
BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT 270-72 (2005).
191
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 770 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
192
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 170, at 11:40 (“Copyright misuse, like patent misuse, originated in the equitable
defense of unclean hands . . . .”).
193
See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (courts “may appropriately
withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public interest.”).
186

291

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2007

America, Inc. v. Reynolds194 for the first time stated that misuse of copyright was a valid
defense to copyright infringement. As long as the right holder uses his copyright “in a
manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”195 his
conduct would amount to copyright misuse and therefore the defendant in question would
not be held liable for the alleged infringing act.196 Since then, the copyright misuse
doctrine has been applied to the cases in which the right holder is deemed abusing
economic rights, e.g. leveraging monopoly to commit anti-competitive action that
facilitates the control of the areas outside the monopoly,197 or abusing judicial process
including lodging an action to achieve an “improper extension and overstatement” of
copyright.198
¶70
At the same time, courts have made clear certain standards for determining misuse
of copyright. For example, there is no need for the defendant to prove whether the
copyright holder has violated antitrust law199 or whether the injury was caused by the
purported conduct of copyright misuse.200 Yet the copyright misuse doctrine is still
fraught with uncertainties. As Goldstein has pointed out, this doctrine “is still in its
infancy . . . and the challenge for courts is to mark the doctrine’s boundaries with some
measure of predictability.”201
¶71
The uncertainty surrounding the copyright misuse doctrine, by and large, stems
from the potentially indeterminate nature of the copyright law’s public policy, the
violation of which results in misuse of copyright. One should note that the public policy
underlying copyright law, for example “to increase the store of human knowledge and
arts”202 or “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good,”203 is, by its nature,
very broad. This gives rise to at least three problems, all of which make the copyright
misuse doctrine relatively unpredictable and amorphous.204
¶72
First, it remains unclear as to what specific types of improper exercise of copyright
can constitute misuse of the concerned right. As with the fair use doctrine, courts are
194

Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 978.
196
Id. at 972-73.
197
See, e.g., Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976-79; DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 60102 (5th Cir. 1996); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Medical Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir.
1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.1998); Alcatel USA v. DGI Techs., 166 F.3d 772, 792-95 (5th
Cir. 1999); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The misuse defense
prevents copyright holders from leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside
the monopoly”).
198
See, e.g., qad. inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d in part,
dismissed in part, 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992); Assessment Techs. of WI, L.L.C. v. WIREdata, Inc., 350
F.3d 640, 647(7th Cir. 2004).
199
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978 (“The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner
violative of antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement is “reasonable”), but whether the
copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.”).
200
See, e.g., Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978-79; qad, 770 F. Supp. at 1267; Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“To defend on misuse grounds, the alleged infringer
need not be subject to the purported misuse.”).
201
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 170, at 11:41.
202
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
203
Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 204; see also DSC Commc’ns, 81 F.3d at 601; qad, 770 F. Supp. at 1266-67.
204
Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First Amendment
Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1308 (1991) (“[The] cryptic ‘public policy’ charge left open the question
of exactly what courts should be trying to accomplish when adjudicating misuse defenses.”).
195
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reluctant to finalize a complete list that contains various copyright misuse acts. While
some courts would spontaneously find misuse of copyright without the petition for such a
finding made by the party in question,205 some are not inclined to do so even when a right
holder’s violation of copyright public policy has been found.206
¶73
Second, the role of public policy in the copyright misuse adjudication seems
relatively fluid. For example, one decision on copyright misuse was not rendered based
upon the consideration of copyright public policy which underpins the copyright misuse
doctrine.207
¶74
Third, puzzles and perplexities still persist throughout the inquiry into the extent to
which an improper exercise of copyright would result in the violation of public policy.
The court in Video Pipeline held that the right holder’s act of restricting the user’s right to
level criticism on its copyrighted films did not amount to a violation of public policy. In
so doing, the court, however, narrowly focused its lens on this single scenario.208 The
court did not broadly consider whether this type of conduct, although lawful in its view,
if commonplace in subsequent similar licensing practices (e.g. applicable to every other
licensee), would actually suppress public criticism on works and thereby trigger a
violation of the copyright law public policy that promotes free speech.
¶75

ii) Public Interest Defense
In the United Kingdom, the public interest defense concerns the “case where it is in
the public interest that the words in respect of which another has copyright should be
published without any sanction.”209 Considerable uncertainty, however, surrounds this
defense. First, courts in the United Kingdom do not consistently hold that the public
interest defense is indeed a general defense available to a defendant in a given
infringement action. Hyde Park Residence Ltd v. Yelland210 is generally seen as the
borderline case about whether the public interest defense actually exists or not. The
public interest defense, according to the pre-Yelland decisions, acted as a general defense
against copyright infringement claim.211 However, the court in Yelland simply ruled that
no such general defense is available in the United Kingdom copyright system.212 In a
post-Yelland decision, Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd.,213 although the court affirmed
the availability of the public interest defense,214 it reasoned that this defense could be
invoked merely in “very rare” circumstances.215 Second, even if Yelland can be seen as
205

See, e.g., qad, 770 F. Supp. at 1266.
See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1992); Sony Computer
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
207
See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Medical Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997).
208
Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 206.
209
BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 190, at 80 (defining the public interest defense as “a defence sitting
out-with the statutory regime that would justify the publication of copyright material in certain
circumstances”).
210
(2001) Ch. 143 [hereinafter Yelland].
211
See Lion Laboratories Ltd. v. Evans (1985) Q.B. 526.
212
See Yelland, ¶ 43 (holding that the law “does not give a court general power to enable an infringer to use
another’s property, namely his copyright in the public interest.”).
213
(2002) Ch. 149 [hereinafter Ashdown].
214
See Ashdown, ¶ 56 (“[W]e think it clear that on the facts of the case he considered that there was a
potential public interest defence to both breach of confidence and breach of copyright”).
215
See id. ¶¶ 47 & 59 (“It will be very rare for the public interest to justify the copying of the form of a
work to which copyright attaches.”).
206
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having been overruled by Ashdown, it does not necessarily mean that courts in the United
Kingdom have drawn clear-cut contours of the public interest defense in a way that
affords sufficient certainty and predictability in its application. For instance, courts have
not elucidated the type of, and the extent to which, information can be disclosed or
published without authorization. The definitional problem with the public interest
defense stems largely from the fact that “public interest,” the essence on which this
defense is based upon, is not amenable to precise definition.216 Accordingly,
commentators have observed that
[The public interest] defense would be too unpredictable. That is, even if
we can trust judges to arrive at the right result in any given case, the
overall effect of such a defense would be to make the law uncertain.
From this perspective, abandoning the relative certainty of the statutory
permitted acts is a high price to pay for the flexibility.217
B. The Second Prong
1. Its Nature and Scope
¶76

Pursuant to the second condition of the three-step test, any limitation on copyright
should not “conflict with a normal exploitation of the work.”218 The Panel Report first
held that normal exploitation involves “less than full use of an exclusive right” by the
copyright holder.219 Moreover, normal exploitation “should be judged for each exclusive
right individually.”220 The non-absolute nature of copyright and the severability of the
exercise of rights, therefore, are seen as the premise to scrutinize whether the second
condition of the three-step test is met.
¶77
Having said that, the Panel Report concluded that a conflict with normal
exploitation of the work would arise when the privileged user enters into “economic
competition” with the concerned right holder. The “economic competition” should be
capable of preventing the right holder from “normally extract[ing] economic value” from
his copyright, thereby depriving him of “significant or tangible commercial gains.”221
Furthermore, the Report pointed out that in examining the copyright holder’s commercial
losses wrought by the privileged use of works, both of their gains in the current as well as
potential markets should be integrally taken in account. In this regard, the Panel
elaborated three standards to consider the extent to which the economic competition
between users and right holders would amount to the conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work:

216

Judge Mance, in his dissenting opinion in Yelland, bluntly pointed out that “the circumstances in which
the public interest may override copyright are probably not capable of precise categorisation or definition.”
See Yelland, ¶ 83.
217
BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 190, at 111 (emphases added).
218
See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 50, art. 13.
219
Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.167.
220
Id. ¶ 6.173.
221
Id. ¶ 6.183.
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The current exploitation of works refers to those that presently
produce “significant or tangible revenue” to right holders.222 With
respect to the potential exploitation of works, only under
circumstances in which the use of a work is likely to generate
“considerable economic or practical importance” for the right
holder can the use fall into the ambit of the “normal
exploitation.”223



There is a need to consider the extent to which actual users,
together with potential users, would become the beneficiaries of
the allegedly invalid limitation on copyright.224



A normal exploitation of works has the dynamics of expanding the
copyright control commensurate with technological and market
developments.225 The privileged use’s effect on the potential
market that is opened up by technological development for new
ways of exploiting works, or the changes in consumer preferences,
should be taken into consideration.226

¶78

To sum up, a violation of the second prong of the three-step test will be triggered if
any given limitation on copyright causes the right holder to suffer “significant or
tangible” commercial losses in either the current or potential market. Because of the use
of the term “tangible,”227 the threshold for violating the second condition may be
relatively low. As long as a “noticeable effect”228 on market substitution can be detected,
a given limitation would be invalidated by the second prong. In other words, only those
limitations that cause a de minimis economic loss to the copyright holder can survive the
second prong’s test. Since the Panel Report centers on the protection of right holders’
economic interests and pays no heed to the users’ interests, public policy analysis simply
plays no role in inquiring into the compliance with the second prong.
¶79
Furthermore, the negotiating history of the three-step test lends strong support to
the Panel Report’s construction of the second prong. As the record of the Stockholm
Conference shows, the architects of the three-step test reasoned that “it was obvious that
all forms of exploiting a work which had, or were likely to acquire, considerable
economic or practical importance must in principle be reserved to the authors.”229 On the
other hand, the Panel Report’s construction based upon “economic normative
222

Id. ¶ 6.180.
Id.
224
Id. ¶ 6.186.
225
See id. ¶ 6.178 (“We described this aspect of normalcy as reflecting a more normative approach to
defining normal exploitation, that includes, inter alia, a dynamic element capable of taking into account
technological and market developments.”).
226
See id. ¶ 6.187.
227
According to the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, one of the meanings of “tangible” is
“clear enough or definite enough to be easily seen or noticed.”
228
See Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000) (The court
infers that the defendant’s allegedly infringing acts “have no noticeable effect on” the plaintiff’s ability to
market their products.).
229
WIPO, supra note 25, at 111.
223
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considerations” has won firm support from leading commentators in the area of copyright
law, though they point out that the Report fails to embrace “non-economic ‘public policy’
considerations.”230
¶80
Commentators have demonstrated that the second prong of the three-step test may
strike down the copyright limitation that permits classroom performance231 and the fair
use exemption that permits copying, translation and display of newspaper excerpts.232
My inquiry into the chilling effects of the second prong of the three-step test, therefore,
centers upon the other copyright limitations that permit private copying and reverse
engineering for software interoperability.
2. Private Copying
¶81

In the shadow of the second prong of the three-step test, the first limitation on
copyright that will come under fire is the one that allows users to copy works for the
private use purpose. To a large extent, there is de facto and de jure recognition of the
limitation with respect to private copying. The reasons for the continuous existence of
this limitation are twofold. On the one hand, it is believed that private copying has
almost no adverse effect on the right holder’s normal exploitation of copyright.233 This
creates little incentive for the right holder to sue individual users. In the analog world,
the confluence of the inconvenience to copy works, the limited scope of disseminating
copies, and the unavoidable degradation in the quality of copies,234 naturally creates the
so-called “state-of-the-art” limitation235 on reproducing and disseminating works. At the
same time, it largely impels consumers to purchase the works, rather than copy them.
Therefore, copyright law or courts take a rather lenient view of private copying. On the
other hand, copyright holders are faced with the virtually insurmountable difficulty in
wiping out private copying. In most circumstances, people make copies in a place that is
not accessible to others. Therefore, it is prohibitively costly for copyright holders to
detect and then sue individual users, making it almost impossible for them to have doorto-door enforcement of copyright.
¶82
The arrival of the digital age, however, has fundamentally altered the landscape that
fits the private copying exemption comfortably into whole picture of copyright law. The
driving force making this exemption in direct conflict with the normal exploitation of
works is derived from the following two shifts in copyright law.

230

RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 45, at 767-773.
See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L.J. 402, n.185 (1997).
232
See Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPs Dispute
Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 441, 486-87 (1997).
233
See, e.g., JANE GINSBURG & YVES GAUBIAC, Private Copying in the Digital Environment, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM 149
(J.C. Kabel and Gerard J.H.M. Mom eds., 1998) (arguing that “in the analogue world, private copying
could be understood as non-infringing because it was de minimis”).
234
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 41 (2003) (“The copy may be of inferior quality and hence not a perfect substitute for the
original.”).
235
See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 217 (1996).
231
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i) Expansive Scope of Economic Right
¶83
Advances in digital technology pave the way for ushering in new forms of
economic rights aimed at vesting in copyright holders increased control over private
copying. With the inception of the WCT and WPPT, copyright holders may apply
technological measures to protect their work. These forms of copyright protection
increase the right holders’ ability to pursue the new business model of exploiting works.
Unlike the traditional communication right regulating non-interactive and point-tomultipoint dissemination of works, the new right enables copyright holders to
communicate their works on an interactive and point-to-point basis. This permits them to
authorize “members of the public” to access protected subject-matter from “a place and at
a time individually chosen by them.”236 The ramifications of setting up this new right are
twofold: first, the use of works for time or place-shifting purpose should now generally
come under copyright control; and second, the concept of “the public” has been
broadened in a way that it incorporates many, if not all, who make noncommercial use of
works in a private setting. At the same time, the legal protection of technological
measures forbids non-permissive circumvention of access-and-copying control.237 This
unprecedented form of copyright protection, to a large extent, legally closes the door for
exempting users from making private copies.
ii) Expansive Interpretation of the Marketability of Works
¶84
By and large, the commercial versus noncommercial distinction acts a crucial
benchmark for drawing the line between the public and private use of works.238 This is
because private use is routinely noncommercial in nature and occasions almost no
economic harm to the marketability of works of authorship. Therefore, courts have found
those involved in the use of works for noncommercial purposes not liable for
infringement. For instance, the Sony court ruled that “time-shifting” of copyrighted
television shows with video tape recorders (VTR) constituted fair use239 primarily
because it did not have negative effects on the current, and in particular, the potential
market for the copyrighted works.240 Relying upon Sony, the court in Recording Industry
Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems241 held that copying for space-shifting
purpose is “paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the
purposes of the [Copyright] Act.”242
¶85
However, it seems that the Sony-based vision of the impact of private copying on
potential market for copyrighted works has been undermined by courts dealing with
236

WCT, supra note 66, art. 8; WPPT, supra note 66, arts. 10, 14. Put differently, the targeted acts of
communication can be measured by whether they are carried out in a manner so that any member of the
public is enabled to determine individually where and/or when they wish to gain access to and use of
protected subject-matter concerned.
237
See WCT, supra note 66, art. 11; WPPT, supra note 66, art. 18; Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
238
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 170, at 12:38.
239
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (“When these factors
are all weighed in the ‘equitable rule of reason’ balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports
the District Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.”).
240
Id. at 454 (“No likelihood of harm was shown at trial, and plaintiffs admitted that there had been no
actual harm to date.”).
241
180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
242
Id. at 1079.
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recent cases on private copying issues. The court in Napster took a leap forward in
redefining the line between commercial and non-commercial uses. It held that
“commercial use is demonstrated by a showing that repeated and exploitative
unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing
authorized copies.”243 Indeed, Napster promotes the idea that, in the digital age,
copyright should be extended “into every corner where consumers derive value from
literary and artistic works.”244 This way of setting up the commercial/noncommercial
dichotomy, by and large, sounds the death knell for the private use exemption that allows
for the use of works for time-shifting or space-shifting purpose.
¶86
The combination of the aforementioned two aspects of the shift in the landscape of
copyright law definitely erodes the traditional adoption of private use. In fact, the private
use exemption plays a catalytic role in usurping copyright holders’ normal exploitation of
works, making it violative of the second prong of the three-step test. In this regard,
Ginsburg and Gaubiac bluntly point out that private copying exemption violates the
second prong of the three-step test:
[The] feature [of exploiting works] illustrates the potential anomaly of
recognizing a private copying exemption in the digital world: individual
copies can no longer be considered de minimis. Private copying in perfect
copies does substitute for sales of the work . . . . If there is a market for
private copying, then unauthorized private copying would conflict with
this norm. Because more and more works are marketed directly to end
users, private copying should no longer be characterized as “certain
special cases”: it is becoming a leading mode of exploitation. As a result,
Berne member nations might be foreclosed from authorizing private
copying in the digital environment.245
3. Reverse Engineering for Software Interoperability
¶87

Computer programs are generally distributed in machine-readable object code
form. Their human-readable source code form, however, is locked up in software
developers’ pockets. This definitely gives rise to the problem that, if the source code is
not accessible to other software developers, there are no linkages interconnecting various
kinds of computer programs in the web of digital world. Hence, the spontaneous efforts
to build up the necessary “bridges” for the interoperable applications of object codes are
246

243

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 236 (1994).
245
GINSBURG & GAUBIAC, supra note 233, at 150-51. See also Christophe Geiger, Right to Copy v. ThreeStep Test: The Future of the Private Copy Exception in the Digital Environment, 1 COMP. L. REV. INT’L 7,
(2005) (drawing the conclusion that the private copying exception violates the second prong of the threestep test); Alison Evans, Private Copying in the EU: Technological Protection and the “Three-Step Test,”
21-2 COPYRIGHT REP. 36, 41-42 (2003) (arguing that the private copying exemption violates the three-step
test).
246
See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Computer programs,
however, are typically distributed for public use in object code form, embedded in a silicon chip or on a
floppy disk.”); see also Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L. J. 1575, 1608 (2002).
244
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of critical importance to sustaining and enhancing a healthy digital environment. In order
to bring this objective to fruition, reverse engineering for software interoperability
enables the architects of digital technology to decompile or disassemble object code. By
and large, this limitation on copyright would blossom into enhanced development of new
software and further produce positive externalities for consumer welfare in the digital
age.247
¶88
Nevertheless, this limitation is highly vulnerable to the challenge posed by the
second part of the three-step test. It can be argued, in the WTO Panel Report’s terms,
that it breeds and facilitates the “economic competition” between the developer and
decompiler of the software in question, occasioning the loss of “significant or tangible
revenue” to the former.248
¶89
Under the Panel’s construction of the second prong, the loss of royalties suffered
by software developers calls into question the validity of the copyright limitation that
allows reverse engineering for software interoperability purpose. To be sure, software
developers’ investments in developing computer programs would justifiably allow them
to offer business licensing of the interfaces to those who want to make their software
compatible with the original programs. Instead of reverse engineering, the “decompiler”
can actually enter into licensing agreement with the copyright owner of the software. As
long as the terms of the licensing agreement are reasonable, achieving interoperability
would not turn out to be prohibitively costly for many software developers. Indeed,
reasonable licensing practice of this type has been deemed legally acceptable. In Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., the court held that the licensing terms laid
down by the copyright holder were lawful and could not be subject to a copyright misuse
challenge.249 By decompiling the computer program at issue, the defendant
presumptively caused irreparable harm to the right holder of the computer program.250
Atari Games epitomizes the software developers’ legitimate interest in the marketing
channel of software through licensing their program code to the “latecomers.” It also
would close a loophole in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade: the failure to consider both
direct and indirect harm to the software developer’s licensing market.251
¶90
However, in the case where copyright holders leverage their monopoly by setting
up unreasonable licensing terms, copyright misuse doctrine can be brought into play to
remedy the potential hardships faced by other software developers.252 To be sure, for
247
The court in Sega pointed out that the reverse engineering at issue “has led to an increase in the number
of independently designed video game programs offered for use [with the plaintiff’s console].” See Sega,
977 F.2d at 1523.
248
Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.180.
249
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The record does not
demonstrate, as a matter of law, that [the licensing] restrictions restrain the creativity of . . . licensees and
thereby thwart the intent of the patent and copyright laws.”). In Sega, the plaintiff “licenses its copyrighted
computer code and its “SEGA” trademark to a number of independent developers of computer game
software. Those licensees develop and sell Genesis-compatible video games in competition with Sega.”
See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
250
See Atari Games, 975 F.2d at 847.
251
See, e.g., Stanley Lai, Recent Developments in Copyright Protection and Software Reverse Engineering
in Singapore: A Triumph for the Ultra-Nationalists, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 525, 532 (1997)
(criticizing the Sega decision on the grounds that the court “did not consider the potential harm caused to
Sega’s existing licensing market, despite its knowledge that other developers had already purchased Sega’s
licences.”).
252
“Accolade explored the possibility of entering into a licensing agreement with Sega, but abandoned the
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those who choose to keep their software’s interfaces closed, these measures are carried
out “not only as a defensive measure against the [software] being commoditized, but as
an offensive measure to capture the market.”253 This business strategy allows firms to
achieve exclusivity of their products in the market. Drawing up the “network effects,”254
the copyright owner can enhance market penetration and dominance. Opening the door
to the reverse engineering, however, would definitely kill this business strategy even in
its very embryonic stage. Therefore, in the face of significant economic losses, copyright
owners like Sega255 and Sony256 had to wage lawsuits against the “decompilers.”
¶91
In these two disputes, courts found the “decompilers” not liable partly because no
significantly adverse impact on the original software developer’s market could be
ascertained.257 This conclusion, however, is not compelling per se and is incongruous
with the second prong of the three-step test. First, courts seemed to assume that a certain
degree of economic loss occasioned by the competition was no bar to finding fair use.
Nonetheless, as the “tangible” economic loss could be definitely perceived in these two
cases, it is hard to deny that the “decompilers” did not adversely affect the normal
exploitation of the programs at issue. Second, even though no significant harm was
caused to the current market of the software developers, it does not necessarily follow
that their potential market would not suffer significant economic loss. The three-step test
compels the consideration of the harm to the potential market, by at least taking into
account the potential users who would become eligible beneficiary of the limitation, and
the potential economic loss to the right holders. Opening the door to the initial reverse
engineering would necessarily allow a succession of followers to decompile the software.
As the number of “decompilers” increase, it is very likely that right holder will suffer
significant economic loss due to the drop in product price or number of purchasing
consumers.258

effort because the agreement would have required that Sega be the exclusive manufacturer of all games
produced by Accolade.” Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514. Although the Sega court did not render the ruling under
the umbrella of the copyright misuse doctrine, it did hold that the plaintiff’s action to monopolize the
market is illegal. This may have opened door to expose Sega’s licensing practice to copyright misuse
doctrine. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24 (“In any event, an attempt to monopolize the market by making it
impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and
cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine.”).
253
Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 246, at 1617.
254
Id.
255
See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1510.
256
See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
257
See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523; Sony, 203 F.3d at 607.
258
As to this point, Stanley Lai questioned the basis on which these two cases were decided by observing
that:
“[T]he court erred in believing that Sega’s market value could go unscathed because it thought
consumers typically might buy more than one video game of the same type. Most consumers
cannot afford to, nor would be inclined to purchase two similar video games. Sega would suffer
significant losses as more companies followed in Accolade’s footsteps to manufacture games
which are Genesis-compatible. There was also the effect of widespread conduct which the court
did not examine – the decision focused only on the infringing use of one competitor, Accolade.”
See Lai, supra note 251, at 532.
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Therefore, by standing in the shoe of consumers, both Sega259 and Sony v.
Connectix260 opened the door for reverse engineering for interoperability purposes based
upon consumer welfare. By contrast, the second prong of the three-step test, according to
the Panel’s interpretation, centers solely on shielding copyright holders’ economic
interests. The need to consider countervailing interests, such as consumer welfare, is by
no means embedded into the second prong. Without being tempered by such a
consideration, its focus on shielding copyright holders’ economic interests can surely
strike down the limitation that permits reverse engineering for software interoperability.
As one commentator bluntly pointed out, “[a] WTO panel could find that the ability to
freely decompile a computer program under Sega conflicts with copyright owner’s ability
to license its programs for that purpose, or that its use in the creation of a noninfringing,
but nevertheless competing, work conflicts with the normal exploitation of the original
program.”261
C. The Third Prong

¶93

¶94

¶95

¶96

¶97

As to the third prong of the three-step test, which provides that a limitation shall
not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder,” the Panel Report
set out three conditions that copyright limitations should satisfy.
First, broader than the economic interests, right holders’ “legitimate interests”
cover those “that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that underlie the protection
of exclusive rights.”262 This connotes that, moral rights, albeit estranged from the TRIPs
regime, can be seen as the part of right holders’ legitimate interests.
Second, right holders’ legitimate interests are unreasonably prejudiced “if an
exception or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of
income” to the right holder.263 In computing the said loss of income, the panel reiterates
that both actual and potential effects on the right holder’s market should be taken into
consideration.264
Third, unreasonable prejudice can be offset by the payment of compensation from
the entrenched compulsory licensing system.265 In this regard, the third prong of the
three-step test “highlight[s] the need for care, moderation, and constraint in constructing
any compulsory licensing scheme under national law.”266
Since the Panel Report admitted that the above approach is incomplete and
conservative,267 weighing the validity of a copyright limitation based upon economic loss
suffered by the right holder, therefore, does not foreclose the other means by which
259

See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24 (“In any event, an attempt to monopolize the market by making it
impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and
cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine.”).
260
See Sony, 203 F.3d 596 at 607 (“Sony understandably seeks control over the market for devices that play
games Sony produces or licenses. The copyright law, however, does not confer such a monopoly.”).
261
Newby, supra note 190, at 1660.
262
Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.224.
263
Id. ¶ 6.229.
264
Id. ¶ 6.247.
265
Id. n.205 (noting that “in cases where there would be serious loss of profit for the copyright owner, the
law should provide him with some compensation”).
266
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 45, at 777.
267
Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.227.
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“unreasonable prejudice” can be measured. If the three-step test is brought into play in
the context of the WCT and WPPT, one possible inquiry that may arise on the horizon is
to examine whether the limitation in question would constitute unreasonable prejudicial
to right holders’ “honor or reputation,” that is, the moral interests embodied in their moral
rights.
¶98
However, one should note the third prong of the three-step test is a relatively
lenient standard. On the one hand, the “unreasonable prejudice” standard is generally far
less strong and strict than the “normal exploitation” standard set out in the second prong
of the three-step test. On the other hand, it is prescribed that an appropriate payment of
compensation which is potentially lower than that under the “normal exploitation”
standard, can redress the “unreasonable prejudice” effect.268
¶99
Although the Panel Report does not elaborate on the normative content of the
“legitimate interests” that the objectives of the copyright law support, it seems that two
points are quite clear. First, “an author would not have a ‘legitimate’ interest in
preventing publication of an unfavorable book review,”269 for this act runs afoul of the
free speech right that copyright law supports. Second, allowing the transformative use
serves the objective of the copyright law and therefore might not be deemed violative of
the third condition of the three-step test. This is because “the more a right-holder’s
assertion of rights tends to prevent others making transformative uses of it, the less likely
that assertion is to involve ‘legitimate’ interest.”270 Hence, it seems that public policy
scrutiny is embedded into the third prong of the three-step test, in determining the scope
of “legitimate uses.”
IV. THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF THE THREE-STEP TEST
¶100

Given the three-step test’s chilling effect on the existence of the above-mentioned
limitations on copyright,271 this Part delves into how the test could be changed in a
manner conducive to the protection and promotion of public interest. To do so, I propose
that the three-step test should be replaced by the following new test:
Members may provide limitations on the exclusive rights, provided that
such limitations take account of the legitimate interests of right holders
and of third parties.

¶101

The creative destruction of the three-step test,272 as shown above, is put forward on
the basis of Article 17 of the TRIPs Agreement, which prescribes the condition with
which “exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark” should comply.273 Moreover,
the test sets forth two interdependent conditions. On the one hand, copyright holders’
268

See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 50, art. 13.
See Ginsburg, supra note 100, at 7.
270
Oliver, supra note 88, at 167.
271
The explanations about why such chilling effect is bad are scattered in first and second subsections of
this Part.
272
For an explanation of “creative destruction,” see supra note 22.
273
See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 50, art. 17 (“Members may provide limited exceptions to the
rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take
account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties.”)
269
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legitimate interests should not be “unreasonably prejudiced.” Put differently, the
legitimacy of any given limitation on copyright hinges partly upon the condition that it
would not be unreasonably prejudicial to the right holders’ legitimate interests. On the
other hand, users’ legitimate interests that underpin the imposition of copyright
limitations should be fully taken into account when the three-step test is invoked. From
this perspective, the new test fully embraces the public policy scrutiny as an
indispensable standard of review. In this sense, my proposal designed to reshape the
three-step test is entirely different from those put forward by Ruth Okediji274 and Daniel
Gervais.275
¶102
In the following discussion, I expound on the reasons why the three-step test should
be replaced by the new test proposed above. To do so, the first section considers the
problems inherent into the first prong of the three-step test, while the next two sections
explore the ways in which the second prong of the test goes astray by not opening the
door for public policy scrutiny. The last section then discusses the extent to which the
new test put forward above would facilitate the realization of the development agenda.
¶103
In addition to the aforementioned objectives, the following discussion aims to give
a response to some leading copyright commentators’ proposition that the public policy
consideration should not be integrated into the review of copyright limitations based upon
three-step test, particularly its first prong.276 In my opinion, they ostensibly erred in
arguing so as they turn a blind eye to the fact that the mandate of public policy scrutiny
has already been set out in other quasi three-step tests under the TRIPs Agreement.277
More importantly, I will provide a set of new perspectives to demonstrate that their
proposition is fundamentally myopic and entirely based upon a misguided perception of
the nature of copyright law in general and copyright limitations in particular.
A. Accommodating the Open Texture of Copyright Limitations
¶104

As shown in Part III, since the first prong of the three-step test requires the any
limitation on copyright should be “clearly defined” and “narrow in scope and reach,”278 it
wields the power to strike down the fair use doctrine and some other common-law
doctrines, all of which are flexible and open-ended in nature. In response to the possible
274

See Ruth Okediji, Towards an International Fair Use Standard, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79
(2000).
275
See Daniel J. Gervais, Towards A New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step
Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2005).
276
Professor Ginsburg posits that the drafters of the three-step test did not intend to incorporate a policy
justification into the first condition and that “the Panel decision correctly eschewed inquiry into the
motivation for a particular exception” on the grounds that “WTO may be ill-suited to condemn local
giveaways” in this respect. See Ginsburg, supra note 100. See also Oliver, supra note 88, at 150 (arguing
that the Panel should be limited to consider whether there is a rational basis for a national exception,
without considering its legitimacy, due to the limited expertise of WTO panels in examining policy issues).
277
See, e.g., TRIPs Agreement, supra note 50, arts. 17, 30 & 26.2. Under these provisions, the
consideration of “the legitimate interests of third parties” is mandatory. Another Panel Report, in which
Article 30 of the TRIPs is interpreted, contends that public policy issues should be taken into account when
considering the scope of the “the legitimate interests of third parties.” See Panel Report, Canada – Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.69, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) (“To make sense of the
term ‘legitimate interests’ in this context, that term must be defined in the way that it is often used in legal
discourse – as a normative claim calling for protection of interests that are ‘justifiable’ in the sense that
they are supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.”) (emphasis added).
278
Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.112.
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demise of these public interest-oriented doctrines, this section questions the desirability
of conferring such sweeping power upon the three-step test. To do so, I argue that, given
the pervasive indeterminacy inherent into legal norms, it is unrealistic and meaningless to
set up the standard as stringent as the first prong of the three-step test does.
1. The Open Texture of Law
¶105

In The Concept of Law, Hart forcefully contends that a number of legal norms, to a
large extent, are vague and indeterminate. He labels this phenomenon as “open texture”
problem that is rooted into the fabric of legal system. “Whichever device, precedent or
legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of behavior, these, however
smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their
application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an
open texture.”279
¶106
The reasons why “open texture” is seen as an inherent characteristic of the legal
system could be understood from the following three perspectives: linguistic
indeterminacy, the limit in human capacities, and the structural need to keep the legal
machinery in motion.
i) Linguistic Indeterminacy
¶107
Language is the vehicle through which law conveys its regulatory signals to the
public at large. Therefore, linguistic determinacy forms the basis of legal determinacy
which acts as the engine generating predictability for people involved in the enterprise of
building law and complying with law. Yet language per se, under many circumstances, is
fraught with uncertainties and indeterminacies which undermine its signaling function.
Hence, as long as the linguistic indeterminacy persists, the seeds of the open texture
problem would keep flowing around in the ocean of legal norms.
¶108
Drawing on the philosophical theory of language established by Wittgenstein280 and
Waismann,281 Hart explicates the ways in which linguistic indeterminacy brings about the
open texture of law. “[I]n the case of legislation, as a general feature of human
language[,] uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general
classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact. Natural
languages like English are when so used irreducibly open-textured.”282
¶109
Clearly, Hart reckons that “[v]agueness is an ineradicable feature of our everyday
language, and its pervasiveness in the law is the most commonly invoked reason for
thinking that the law is indeterminate.”283
279

H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127-28 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis in origin).
Id. at 125 & 297 n.1
281
Id. at 128 & 297 n.1.
282
According to Felix Cohen, “A definition is in fact a type of insurance against certain risks of confusion.
It cannot, any more than can a commercial insurance policy, eliminate all risks. Absolute certainty is as
foreign to language as to life. There is no final insurance against an insurer’s insolvency. And the words
of a definition always carry their own aura of ambiguity. But a definition is useful if it insures against risks
of confusion more serious than any that the definition itself contains.” Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 836 (1935) (emphasis added).
283
Christopher L. Kutz, Note, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law, 103
YALE L.J. 997, 1004 (1994). For an insightful discussion about Hart’s theory of legal indeterminacy, see
BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY (1993); TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN
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ii) Facing Impossibility: The Limits of Human Capacities
¶110
Locating everyday social life in the ocean of legal norms with the company of tens
of millions of “lighthouses” (regulatory signals) does not necessarily mean that we
comfortably “dwell in possibility.”284 Rather, we still dwell in impossibility due to the
limits in human abilities285 in foreseeing what will occur in future and then figuring out
how we can deal with them beforehand. Hence, the letters of the law, no matter how
general or specific they are, do not provide definite and exhaustive answers in order to
sidestep any future legal pitfalls. Accordingly, Hohfeld observed that “[t]he strictly
fundamental legal relations are, after all, sui generis; and thus it is that attempts at formal
definition are always unsatisfactory, if not altogether useless.”286
¶111
Hart, in explicating law’s “open texture” problem, was fully mindful of the
correlation between legal indeterminacy and the limits in human abilities, as he
straightforwardly acknowledged that “we are men, not gods.”287 To Hart, the limits in
human abilities to clear away the cloud of legal indeterminacy is attributable to the two
handicaps we the human beings unfortunately suffer:
It is a feature of the human predicament (and so of the legislative one) that
we labor under two connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate,
unambiguously and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of
general standards to be used without further official direction on particular
occasions. The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second
is our relative indeterminacy of aim.288
¶112

Patently, these two handicaps, in Hart’s vision, are the very roots of the opentextured nature of law. This is because “human legislators can have [no] knowledge of
all possible combinations of circumstances which the future may bring. This inability to
anticipate brings with it a relative indeterminacy of aim.”289 In this respect, Hart himself
unwittingly generalizes Justice Marshall’s emphatic expounding of indeterminacy as the
inherent nature of constitutional law to the universe of law:
It was impossible for the framers of the constitution to specify,
prospectively, all these means, both because it would have involved an
immense variety of details, and because it would have been impossible for
them to foresee the infinite variety of circumstances, in such an
unexampled state of political society as ours, for ever changing and for
ever improving. How unwise would it have been, to legislate immutably

LAW (2000); Michael Steven Green, Dworkin’s Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach
Us about the Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1897 (2003).
284
Emily Dickinson, I Dwell in Possibility, in COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON (1993).
285
YEHEZKEL DROR, THE CAPACITY TO GOVERN: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME 118 (2002) (“Certainly,
humanity has not reached the limits of its potential for management of itself and its environment, there
being much scope also for improving capacities to govern and build a better future.”).
286
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
287
HART, supra note 279, at 128.
288
Id.
289
Id.
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for exigencies which had not then occurred, and which must have been
foreseen but dimly and imperfectly!290
iii) Structural Need of the Legal System
To be sure, the whole legal system deals with the nuances and complexities
embedded into the web of human behaviors which are fraught with uncertainties and
indeterminacies.291 The structure of a legal system, therefore, should and must be
designed in a manner sufficiently responsive to an ocean of ever-changing circumstances
and unpredictable factors that occur in the social machinery.292 This is because a legal
system that accommodates “allocations of institutional responsibility” should be
understood as “a rich, fluid, and evolving set of norms for effective governance and
dispute resolution, not as a positivist system of fixed and determinate rules.”293 From this
perspective, a certain degree of flexibility and fluidity of legal norms, to a large extent,
stems from the structural need to maintain the legal system open and broad enough to
grapple with an extremely wide range of legal matters. Such flexibility within particular
applications of legal norms helps to stabilize the legal system as a whole.
¶114
The design of constitutional law epitomizes the “open texture” problem derived
from the structural need of legal system. In order to promote governmental efficiency
and to prevent tyranny,294 the notion of separation of powers becomes the heart of modern
constitutional law which distributes power horizontally and vertically. However, in U.S.,
the constitutional framework of power separation “has been sufficiently flexible over the
past two centuries”295 in that “[t]he enumeration [of power] presupposes something not
enumerated.”296 The reason to do so was expounded by McCulloch v. Maryland:
¶113

A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may
be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind . . . . That this idea
was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to
be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.297
¶115

Moreover, in United States v. Lopez,298 Justice Rehnquist highlighted the structural
need-based reasons why the Commerce Clause has been operated within the framework

290

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 385 (1819).
See RUSSELL HARDIN, INDETERMINACY AND SOCIETY 1 (2003) (arguing that “indeterminacy is real,”
pervasive and intractable in virtually all social contexts).
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See Cohen, supra note 282, at 884 (“Law is a social process, a complex of human activities and
adequate legal science must deal with human activity, with cause and effect, with the past and the future . . .
. Legal system, principles, rules, institutions, concepts, and decisions can be understood only as functions
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See Richard H. Fallon, Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 965
(1994).
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GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 359 (2005).
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Id. at 339.
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of legal indeterminacy ever since the judiciary’s duty “to say what the law is” was
declared by Marbury v. Madison:299
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial
or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty. But, so
long as Congress’ authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the
Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as
having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under
the Commerce Clause always will engender ‘legal uncertainty.’ . . . The
Constitution mandates this uncertainty by withholding from Congress a
plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of
legislation . . . . Any possible benefit from eliminating this “legal
uncertainty” would be at the expense of the Constitution’s system of
enumerated powers.300
2. The Open Texture of Copyright Law
¶116

The problem of legal indeterminacy, as the foregoing discussion showed, is
inherently pervasive in the letters of law. In this respect, commentators have boldly
proclaimed that “[legal] certainty is only an illusion,”301 and “law is necessarily vague.”302
While the radical indeterminacy of law as the critical legal scholarship suggests303 is still
contestable, the fact that law has different degrees of moderate indeterminacy is now
universally accepted.304
¶117
When it comes to copyright law, there are legal norms that are determinate on its
face. For example, it is prescribed that the term of copyright spans to life of author plus
seventy years after his death. Yet the copyright statute, by and large, is awash with a host
of vague standards and concepts, many of which form the lifeblood of copyright
protection. As a threshold standard for copyright protection, the idea/expression
dichotomy exemplifies the “open texture” problem inherent into copyright statutes.
¶118
The idea/expression dichotomy305 teaches that only the expression of ideas, rather
than ideas, is copyrightable. Yet charting the boundaries between idea and expression is
no easy work in many cases. On the one hand, while the idea/expression dichotomy is
hailed as a universal standard for setting the threshold of copyright protection, no efforts
as to what elements of works would fall into the two baskets of “idea” and “expression”
respectively, have ever been done in any national and international copyright law. The
299

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
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See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
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absence of this kind of line-drawing effort stems from the fact that the making of such
“tangible baskets” is entirely beyond the human capacities. Given the extremely rich,
fast-changing, ever-expanding nature of the pluralist society, it is impossible for
legislators to exhaust all the past, current and future circumstances in which ideas are
created, and then draw the dividing line for every category of ideas and their expressions.
Hence Judge Hand lamented that “[n]obody has ever been able to fix [the] boundary
[between idea and expression], and nobody ever can.”306 Moreover, one should note that
the creation of “ideas” defies any artificial interference into the universe of innovation
and creativity. Indeed, ideas are created by the sparks of human mind that know no
boundaries and are kindled by the spirit of freedom of thinking.
¶119
On the other hand, it seems that the nature of many non-literary forms of works
renders it increasingly difficult to perceive the dividing line between idea and expression.
For example, with respect to the artistic work, it becomes routinely hard to determine
what is the “idea” conveyed therein and what is the “expression” that functions to
communicate such “idea” to the public. The court in Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.,307
gives up the attempt to carry out the typical line-drawing effort to deal with the
idea/expression dichotomy. It simply acknowledges that the distinction between idea and
expression “breaks down” in the case of artistic work:
For one thing, it is impossible in most cases to speak of the particular
“idea” captured, embodied, or conveyed by a work of art because every
observer will have a different interpretation. Furthermore, it is not clear
that there is any real distinction between the idea in a work of art and its
expression. An artist’s idea, among other things, is to depict a particular
subject in a particular way. As a demonstration, a number of cases from
this Circuit have observed that a photographer’s “conception” of his
subject is copyrightable. By “conception,” the courts must mean
originality in the rendition, timing, and creation of the subject – for that is
what copyright protects in photography. But the word “conception” is a
cousin of “concept,” and both are akin to “idea.” In other words, those
elements of a photograph, or indeed, any work of visual art protected by
copyright, could just as easily be labeled “idea” as “expression.”308
¶120

Given the aforementioned factors, courts facing the task of differentiating between
idea and expression have been tormented by dealing with the pitfall of drawing such a
dividing line. As a result, there is no shortage of the statement echoing in courtrooms
which laments that the idea/expression dichotomy is “elusive”309 and “an imprecise
tool.”310 Against this backdrop, William Patry initiates a postmodernist critique of the
mechanical interpretation of the idea/expression dichotomy:
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[W]e are better off if we appreciate that the idea-expression dichotomy is
not an analytical tool; it is not a test; “idea” and “expression” are simply
labels that reflect that some material is protected and some isn’t, and that
determination is always after-the-fact . . . . “Idea” and “expression” are
not categories that have content; they do not express set characteristics;
they are just metaphors by which we pretend we are reasoning a priori,
when in truth we are engaged in fact-finding.311
¶121

To be sure, the idea/expression dichotomy is by no means the single standard that
has no clear contours in the realm of copyright law. A host of other standards like
“originality,” “fixation,” and so forth, have bedeviled the rule-makers in a way that they
make the copyright law’s reservoir full of poorly-shaped “filters.” For example, in the
Da Vinci Code case, Justice Smith simply acknowledged that “originality” as the
threshold standard for copyright protection is “potentially confusing.”312 Also, “the test
for infringement of a copyright” is deemed “of necessity vague.”313 Yet these standards
tacitly allow courts to adjust the shape of the “filters” in response to specific facts
involved in hard cases. This is exactly what Hart envisions as to the role of courts/judges
in dealing with legal indeterminacy when adjudicating hard cases. In this respect, he
succinctly concluded that “[t]he open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of
conduct where much must be left to be developed by courts or officials striking a balance,
in the light of circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight from
case to case.”314
3. The Open Texture of Copyright Limitations

¶122

Generally speaking, there are two competing modes of copyright limitations. The
fair use doctrine, representative of the first mode, is embedded with the broad and
flexible approach to carve out limitations on copyright. As long as the general conditions
are met, any unauthorized act of using works would be exempted from the potential
liability. Thus, the doctrine per se does not set out the whole range of the privileged uses
of works. Apart from the United States, several other countries have adopted315 or are
considering to the feasibility of including this doctrine in their copyright systems.316 By
contrast, the second mode, represented by the EU Copyright Directive, itemizes an
exhaustive list of specific limitations on copyright and prescribes specific conditions
under which each limitation could be invoked. The privileged use of works, under this
carefully designed regulatory hierarchy, should closely follow the specifics of
instructions given by the law. Equipped with the pre-set detailed limits, the radar screen

311
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of the latter mode of law is designed to facilitate rapid detection of those users who have
gone beyond the preview of allowable uses.
As demonstrated in Part III, the first mode runs afoul of the requirements set forth
in the first prong of the three-step test, namely copyright limitations should be “clearly
defined” and “narrow in scope and reach.”317 By contrast, it seems that the second mode
could square comfortably with the first prong of the three-step test, given its endeavors to
keep the legal rules “clearly defined” and “narrow in scope and reach.” Therefore, such
requirements contained in the first prong would potentially bring about a radical shift in
the legislative structure of copyright law simply by forcing countries who accept the first
mode to embrace the second mode.
Given the pervasiveness of legal indeterminacy in legal norms in general and
copyright statutes in particular, one would naturally question whether the three-step test
is a legally sound and reasonable enough to be instilled the sweeping power to weed out
the first mode of copyright limitations. To do so, one would need to consider whether the
first mode of copyright limitations, represented by the fair use doctrine, is consistent with
the fundamental justifications for the existence of open texture of law.
First, as language is the vehicle through which copyright limitations are put in
motion, linguistic indeterminacy necessarily begets the open-texture problem for the fair
use doctrine. This also means that even the second mode of copyright limitations would
necessarily suffer from the open-texture problem no matter how earnestly the legislators
draft the law in painstaking detail with respect to the ways in which specific conditions
should be met.
Second, the legislative inability to foresee and deal with all potential circumstances
makes it understandable that the fair use doctrine is structured in an open-ended and
flexible manner. In contrast with the second mode, the indeterminacy carried by fair use
doctrine becomes the advantage of first mode. This is because the fair use doctrine’s
open-ended nature has the advantage of adapting copyright limitations to potentially
novel ways of exploiting works, making the framework of copyright law largely
coterminous with the needed legislative changes spawned by continuous development in
technology.318
Third, since copyright law is dealing with complicated and ever-changing legal
relation in exploiting works of authorship, it is natural that a certain degree of flexibility
ought to be imbedded into its whole legislative framework. More importantly, copyright
limitations are geared to serve public interest which is not amenable to definition because
of the heterogeneity and variety of general human needs it conveys.319 For example,
framers of the United States Constitution were unsure about what “freedom of speech”
means; Benjamin Franklin acknowledged that “few of us, I believe, have distinct Ideas of
Its Nature and Extent.”320 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist straightforwardly pointed out that
317

Panel Report, supra note 3, ¶ 6.112.
Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 41, 43-47 (2001) (summarizing “the social functions of fair use” and in particular pointing out that
“fair use adapts copyright to new technologies that pose challenges for the traditional copyright
framework”).
319
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of State of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 751 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that “the public interest is composed of many diverse interests”).
320
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, The Court of The Press (1789), reprinted in 10 The Writings of Benjamin
Franklin 37 (Albert Smyth ed., 1907). Moreover, Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers:
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“the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment – never fully clarified, to
be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully clarified.”321 In dealing with the case
concerning the public interest defense, Judge Mance inferred that “the circumstances in
which the public interest may override copyright are probably not capable of precise
categorization or definition.”322 Therefore, there is a structural need to keep the copyright
limitations flexible enough to accommodate the malleability of “public interest.”
¶128
Having said that, it seems that the first prong of the three-step test, imbued with the
power to strike copyright limitations carved out in the first mode, is utterly at odds with
the phenomenon of open texture which is the intrinsic hallmark of the legal system in
general and copyright law in particular. More importantly, it should be pointed out that
the three-step test per se is no “bright line”323 rule and therefore is fraught with
uncertainties.324 For example, at the Stockholm Conference, the Israeli delegation
reminded the delegation of the uncertainty that surrounds the words “in certain particular
cases,” “legitimate interests,” and “normal exploitation.”325 As long as legal
indeterminacy is the “gene” inherent into the legal system and could not be eliminated
within the boundaries of human capabilities, it is safe to draw the conclusion that the first
prong of the three-step test is founded upon the misconception that all the open-texture
problems underlying copyright limitations should be “genetically modifiable and
modified” by national legislators.
B. Taking Users’ Human Rights Seriously
¶129

The inquiry into the legitimacy of the second prong of the three-step test begs the
question of whether it is valid for the test to fill up its gravitational field solely with the
instruments whose mission is to protect copyright holders’ interests. In other words,
should the need to protect the interest of the users at large be integrated into the test’s
skein? This section delves into the extent to which users’ interests ought to be protected
under the framework of copyright law. First of all, I explore the ways in which users’
rights could be fit into the landscape of copyright law in general and copyright limitations
in particular. In contrast to the approaches embraced by recent literature discussing the
status of users’ rights in copyright law,326 I capitalize on rights discourse in the
framework of human rights law to explore the importance of users’ rights in the field of
copyright law. Second, I center my inquiry into the nature of copyright limitations and
the extent to which users’ interests can and should be embedded into them. In so doing, I

“What signifies a declaration that ‘the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved?’ What is the
liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?”
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 514 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
321
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
322
Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland, [2001] Ch. 143, 172.
323
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 45, at 777.
324
See David J. Brennan, The Three-Step Test Frenzy – Why the TRIPS Panel Decision Might be
Considered Per Incuriam, 2 I.P.Q. 212, 224 (2002) (arguing that the test does “create uncertainty”); Carlos
M. Correa, TRIPS Agreement: Copyright and Related Rights, 25 INT’L REV.INDUS.PROP. & COPYRIGHT L.
543, 549 (1994) (arguing that the three-step test “fails to give useful guidance on how to tackle some of the
more complex issues involved in the applications of exceptions to exclusive rights”).
325
WIPO, supra note 25, at 622.
326
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005);
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003).
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question the legitimacy of the second prong of the three-step test by demonstrating that it
leaves too little room for the protection of users’ rights in its measuring the legality of the
limitations on copyright.
1. Building Users’ Rights within the Human Rights Framework
¶130

Human rights law provides an excellent framework within which rights talk
concerning intellectual products could be animated in a way to bring about a more lucid
and intimate understanding of the nature of competing rights enjoyed by creators and
users. Based upon the major international human rights treaties, e.g. the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR), and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the following discussion itemizes and canvasses the major human rights
enjoyed by creators and users respectively.

i) Creators’ Rights
¶131
According to UDHR and CESCR, “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author.”327 Therefore, the creators of original works shall be entitled to
this form of human right, namely the right to benefit from the protection of creative work.
Intellectual property in general and copyright in particular, are afforded with limited term
of protection and can be waived, licensed and transferred in most circumstances. By
contrast, human rights represent the “timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of
the human person”328 and are by nature inalienable. From this perspective, copyright
together with other forms of intellectual property, therefore, does not fit comfortably into
the human rights skein.329 Yet copyright is indispensable and the most important vehicle
through which the right to benefit from the protection of creative work is respected,
protected and fulfilled. In this sense, copyright can be seen at least as a quasi-human
right. On the other hand, a large number of users who create new works by tapping into
others’ intellectual fruits can and should become the beneficiaries of the same human
rights protection.
¶132

ii) Users’ Rights
While human rights law provides affirmative protection of creators’ interest in their
intellectual products, it does not necessarily follow that users of copyrighted works are
powerless. Rather, they are conferred upon a series of human rights, the conferral of
which is not conditioned by their identity as users of copyrighted works. Among the
whole bundle of human rights they enjoy, the following four categories of rights, in my
view, are the most relevant to the rights talk associated with copyright law.

327

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, art. 27.2, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 15.1(c), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CESCR].
328
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the
Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic
Production of Which He Is the Author (art. 15(1)(c) of the Covenant), ¶ 2, Draft General Comment No. 17,
E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006).
329
Id.
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a)

The Right to Freedom of Expression
¶133
The freedom “to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”330 is hailed as one of
the fundamental human rights universally enjoyed by all human beings.
¶134
On the one hand, it has been universally accepted that government shall be
prohibited from abridging the freedom of speech.331 The ban of this type guarantees the
negative liberty for all human beings, insulating them from unwarranted coercion that
suppresses their speech. Mill contends that the “peculiar evil of silencing the expression
of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing
generation – those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.”332
Therefore, censoring speech would always lead to public silence and further breed the
abuse of power by the government. From this perspective, without governmental
intervention, people can freely search for the light of truth. According to Justice Holmes,
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out.”333 Regarding Holmes’s “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, Justice Brandeis
further added that “freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”334 Hence, serving as
essential checking value on government’s power, free speech is of paramount importance
to the building and enhancing of democratic society.
¶135
On the other hand, the free speech right further promotes the realization of the
positive freedom for all human beings, providing them with sufficient “breathing room”
for expressing their own ideas. Facilitated by the practice that “debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”335 free speech protection hugely promotes
autonomy. As Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out, free speech “serves not only the
needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit – a spirit that demands selfexpression.”336 By experiencing self-expression and self-determination,337 people
“acquire intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general
welfare.”338 Moreover, the protection of free speech is essential to the fostering of
tolerance which enhances the solidarity and coherence of our society. This is because the
free speech principle “involves a special act of carving out one area of social interaction
for extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a

330

UDHR, supra note 327, art. 19; CESCR, supra note 327, art. 19.
This means that under extremely limited circumstances can the government adopt measures regulating
speech. For example, government may regulate speech that is deemed as incitement of illegal activities,
fighting words, or obscenity.
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JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (1859).
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Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974).
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Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 994 (1978)
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social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social encounters.”339 Indeed,
nurturing tolerance contributes to shaping “the intellectual character of the society.”340
b)

The Right to Education
¶136
People are nurtured and cultivated by education throughout their life. From this
perspective, education is indeed “a necessity of life.”341 The right to education, therefore,
is heralded as one of the fundamental human rights, as it is declared that “[e]veryone has
the right to education.”342
¶137
The negative liberty dimension of the right to education indicates that the state has
the affirmative duty to facilitate the development of education at various levels. Pursuant
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,“[e]ducation shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.”343 Moreover, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights elaborates the additional
duties for the state to promote and protect the right to education:
[T]he Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as
possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole
period of their primary education; The development of a system of schools
at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall
be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be
continuously improved.344
¶138

On the other hand, the right to education has its “positive liberty” dimension.
Education, in De Tocqueville’s vein, is capable of “arousing a sleeping population, and of
giving it passions and knowledge which it does not possess.”345 In Brown v. Board of
Education,346 education is seen as “a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment.”347 Consequently, Brown forcefully concludes that
education forms “the very foundation of good citizenship.”348 Indeed, the “positive
liberty” dimension of the right to education is highlighted by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. It is stated that:
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and
339

LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA 9-10 (1986) (emphasis added).
340
Id. at 120.
341
JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 1 (1997).
342
UDHR, supra note 327, art. 26; CESCR, supra note 327, art. 13.
343
UDHR, supra note 327, art. 26.1.
344
CESCR, supra note 327, arts. 13.3(d)-(e).
345
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 75 (2003) (Bevan Trans.).
346
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
347
Id. at 493.
348
Id.
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fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.349
c)

The Right to Cultural Participation
¶139
“Human development is a cultural process. As a biological species, humans are
defined in terms of our cultural participation.”350 Indeed, this vision of human
development lays the very foundation for the human right to cultural participation.351
¶140
On the one hand, the state should facilitate rather than impede individuals’ freedom
to cultural participation. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights places much
emphasis on the requirement that states should allow citizens to enjoy full latitude in
“freely [participating] in the cultural life of the community.”352 In this sense, cultural
participation is the very realm of life that is free of unreasonable state surveillance,
interference, and coercion. Moreover, under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, states shall adopt various measures to “achieve the full
realization of [the] right [to cultural participation].”353 The measures include “those
necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and
culture.”354 Moreover, states shall “respect the freedom indispensable for scientific
research and creative activity.”355
¶141
On the other hand, the very freedom to take part in the cultural life enhances the
human ability to think and provides numerous bridges that culturally connects individual
from all various walks of life. Thus, the right to cultural participation nurtures human
functional capabilities of “[b]eing able to use imagination and thought in connection with
experiencing and producing self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice,
religious, literary, musical, and so forth.”356
d)

The Right to Benefit from Scientific and Technological Development
¶142
The intervening one hundred years have witnessed an unprecedented shift in human
life brought about by scientific and technological developments. To be sure, the
development of science and technology serves to promoting human well-being and
provides people with enhanced capabilities to pursue their own good life. As the
convenience afforded by science and technology has become an indispensable part of
human life, the right “to share in scientific advancement and its benefits” has been
enshrined in human rights treaties.357 The “negative and positive liberties” dimensions of
this right are closely akin to those of the right to cultural participation.358
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2. The Nature of Copyright Limitations
“Can we create meaning for our lives without demeaning the lives of others?”359
Indeed, behind this perplexing metaphysical question lies a phenomenon called “conflict
of rights.” From a utilitarian perspective, human beings have an inherent inclination to
fulfill their desires, maximize their satisfaction, and minimize their pain and suffering.
“[T]he grand governing law of human nature” is, Mill reckoned, to “render the persons
and properties of human beings subservient to our pleasures.”360 The society as a whole,
therefore, is formed by individuals who seek ultimate utility from their environments.
Yet, resources available are scarce and cannot do justice to all the desires harbored by
utilitarianism-minded persons. Hence, conflict of rights is inevitable when the interested
parties claim they have stronger interest in certain resources than others do. Indeed,
conflicts of rights are pervasive in an increasingly pluralistic society, due to the diversity
and heterogeneity of people’s values and beliefs.
¶144
When it comes to copyright law, the conflict of rights enjoyed by creators and users
respectively looms large in the everyday production, dissemination and consumption of
copyrighted works. As a set of exclusive rights vested in creators, copyrights would
surely prevent users from reproducing and distributing works of authorship. However,
users can assert that, without being allowed to take any of the above actions, their human
rights to freedom of expression, education, cultural participation, and the benefit from
scientific and technological development would be unquestionably undermined and
eroded. This because the fulfillment or realization of these human rights, as they argue,
cannot be achieved without being given an appropriate degree of freedom to use the
copyrighted work concerned. For example, a parodist who affirmatively exercises his
free speech right,361 as Justice Souter has pointed out, would necessarily need to “‘conjure
up’ the original in order to parody it.”362
¶145
Against this backdrop, copyright legislators and policymakers “confront the issues
at stake and can then settle the question by choosing between the competing interests in
the way which best satisfies us.”363 The limitations on copyright, therefore, are designed
by copyright legislators and policymakers to deal with the conflict of rights in this
context. Guided by the principle that “[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,’”364 they exercise the state police power to intervene in many circumstances, if not
¶143
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all, giving the trump card to users’ rights and thereby setting out limitations to
circumscribe the exercise of copyrights and to facilitate the materialization of users’
human rights. In this sense, the limitations on copyright could be seen as users’
privileges,365 because the state allows them to act affirmatively to use works for the
purpose of fulfilling their underlying human rights. According to Hohfeldian Jural
Relations, “a privilege is the opposite of a duty, and the correlative of a ‘no-right.’”366
Therefore, in Hohfeld’s terms, a user has the privilege to use a work. As long as he acts
within the boundaries of the permission conferred by the state, the copyright holder can
not interfere with such use of his work. In other words, the user in question has no duty
(to the right holder) not to use the work.
¶146
The aforementioned decision adopted by the state reflects the notion that “the right
of the owner to use his property is not absolute . . . . [U]ses, once harmless, may, owing
to changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare.”367 Against this backdrop,
“the legislature has power to prohibit such uses . . . and the power to prohibit extends
alike to the manner, the character and the purpose of the use.”368
¶147
In granting users the privilege to use copyrighted works, the state has two arrows
on its quiver. On the one hand, the state can grant fair-use type privileges. By doing so,
it allows users to invade an entitlement without the right holder’s consent and allows
users to escape paying the damages to the right holder. Alternatively, the state can grant
a less strong privilege that allows users to copy works without the right holder’s
authorization yet with the requirement to pay an appropriate amount of remuneration to
the right holder. In short, the granting of two types of privileges largely reflects the
notion that the fundamental rights including the right to private property can be
reasonably restricted by “lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good of
all.”369
¶148
However, the making of the above-mentioned limitations on copyright necessarily
begs the question of the extent to which state’s exercise of police power is legitimate.
Put differently, given that the governmental power should be limited in any given
democratic society, there is a need to set up a mechanism as the check on the state’s
exercise of its police power to invade copyright, which is a species of private property.
To gauge the legitimacy of the exercise of state power in this regard, there are three types
promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings . . . .”). Similar
conclusions can be found in other cases. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); U.S. v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Computer
Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526
(1994).
365
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that fair dealing provisions should be “styled as users’ rights”).
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of tests which have been widely deployed as standards of review in the framework the
American constitutional law:


Strict scrutiny.370 Any given limitation on copyright is deemed
lawful if it is proved necessary to achieve its objective a
compelling government purpose. Under this test, the government
needs to prove that there is a compelling governmental interest to
carve out the limitation and it has taken the least restrictive
measures to achieve the governmental interest in protecting certain
kinds of human rights enjoyed by users.



Intermediate scrutiny.371 Any given limitation on copyright is
deemed lawful if it is proved substantially related to an important
government purpose. Under this test, the government needs to
prove that there is an important governmental interest to carve out
the limitation and a substantial correlation between the limitation
on copyright and the governmental interest in protecting certain
kinds of human rights enjoyed by users.



Rational basis test.372 Any given limitation on copyright is deemed
lawful if it is proved rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. Under this test, the government needs to prove that there
is a legitimate governmental interest to carve out the limitation and
a rational correlation between the limitation on copyright and the
governmental interest in protecting certain kinds of human rights
enjoyed by users.

¶149

Among the above three tests, in my opinion, the last one – rational basis test – is
the most reasonable to become the check on the state’s exercise of its police power. The
reasons for choosing the last test – minimum level of scrutiny and most deferential to
government policies – are as follows.
¶150
First, compared with tangible property, copyright as a species of intangible
property has much stronger direct relation to the public at large.373 When it comes to
tangible property, the private/public distinction may be applicable in that it has no public
goods nature. On the contrary, the private/public distinction may not fit comfortably into
the sphere of intellectual products due to their nature of being public goods. Generally
speaking, intellectual products can be consumed by different users at the same time, and
each user’s consumption of the product does not diminish its quality. On the other hand,
the public goods nature of intellectual products indicates that they have a much closer
correlation to public interest than tangible property. Given their eminence in each user’s
daily life, intellectual products, albeit subject to creators’ proprietary control, have taken
370
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their roots deep into users’ capabilities to think, to study, and to express their own ideas.
As Justice Thurgood Marshall has pointed out, “Ownership does not always mean
absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it.”374 Hence, copyrights in intellectual
products shall enjoy much lower level of protection than tangible property does, and the
state has stronger police power to regulate the former property rights than the latter.
¶151
Second, users’ human rights, which the state intends to protect, carry the
fundamental values of our human society. The promotion and protection of human
rights, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has stated, is to fulfill “the inherent
dignity and [the] equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”375 To
do so, we human beings collaborate with one another with the mutual intention to lay
“the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”376 From this perspective,
human rights protection is “the highest aspiration of the common people.”377 Moreover,
if we see human rights as “the function of man,”378 human development is formed by “a
combination of various ‘doing and beings,’ with quality of life to be assessed in terms of
the capability to achieve valuable functionings.”379 Therefore, the promotion of human
rights is to facilitate the pursuit of happiness as “a virtuous activity of the soul,”380 and
further to fulfill the value of functioning as a real “social being.”381 In turn, the capability
approach to human rights protection directs “government to think from the start about
what obstacles there are to full and effective empowerment for all citizens, and to devise
measures that address these obstacles.”382 As “knowledge, information and
communication are at the core of human progress, endeavor, and well-being” in the
digital age,383 the government has a very strong legitimate interest in allowing users’
human rights to override creators’ copyrights in certain circumstances.
¶152
Third, certain eminent domain cases lend strong support to rational basis test. First,
they infer that courts should show sufficient deference to government’s public policy for
taking property on the grounds of public use. For example, in Kelo v. City of New
London,384 Justice Stevens emphatically argued the case for deferential standard of
review, by concluding that “[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined that concept
broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field . . . . For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed
rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in
374
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determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”385 Second, the
rational basis test has been overwhelmingly employed in the eminent domain cases.386 In
Kelo, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion contended that “demanding level of scrutiny
. . . is not required simply because the purpose of the taking is economic development.”387
In other words, in the case involving taking property for economic development which
benefits the public at large, the rational basis test could be presumptively applicable. The
ruling of Kelo in this regard, therefore, indicates that invading property rights for the
general public interests should not be subject to a high level of scrutiny. The deferential
standard of review is appropriate because protecting public interest is of paramount
importance to the development of the society as a whole. This practice can also be
applied to measuring the legitimacy of the state’s exercise of police power to lay down
limitations on copyright, because copyright, as shown above, has an intimate connection
to the promotion of public interest. Moreover, the protection of users’ human rights, in
many cases, is exceedingly significant to promote freedom and justice in our society.
3. Eldred
¶153

When weighing competing interests, some courts come to the erroneous conclusion
that copyright as a form of property is necessarily stronger than users’ rights. In Eldred
v. Ashcroft,388 while the lower court’s holding that copyrights are “categorically immune
from challenges under the First Amendment” was rejected,389 Justice Ginsburg, who
penned the majority opinion, denied to examine whether the expansion of copyright at
issue would impinge upon users’ free speech rights. She argued that the presence of the
built-in mechanisms in the realm of copyright law, including the fair use exemptions,
have already reconciled the conflict of rights in the area of copyright law. More
importantly, she offered the perspective as to how the potential conflict between
copyright and free speech right could be addressed:
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make – or decline
to make – one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the
right to make other people’s speeches. When, as in this case, Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.390

¶154

Yet one can easily note that the Court’s very reluctance to revisit whether the socalled “built-in First Amendment accommodations” would sufficiently protect users’ free
speech rights is actually based upon the dubious premise that the free speech right is
necessarily inferior to property right when the two are in conflict with each other. Thus
385
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the Court implicitly embraces the premise that the fair use exemption acts merely as the
“affirmative defense” available to users in the proceedings. The “affirmative defense”
premise, however, would give rise to the problem that users’ rights are automatically
“ranked” lower than copyrights.
¶155
In treating users’ rights “with indifference,”391 Justice Ginsburg entirely neglected
Justice Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, which emphatically argued
that “[t]he fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression.”392 Moreover, she also turned a blind
eye to Marsh v. Alabama, which forcefully argued the case for the primacy of free speech
rights over property rights:
To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to
be properly informed their information must be uncensored. There is no
more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these
freedoms with respect to any other citizen . . . . When we balance the
Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to
enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful
of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.393
¶156

Furthermore, courts in Europe have dealt specifically with the conflict between
copyright and free speech rights, holding that the latter right can take precedence over the
former in the cases concerned. In Ashdown v. Telegraph,394 a watershed decision on the
U.K. public interest defense, Lord Phillips explicitly stated that free speech right can
override copyright, stating, “[n]ow that the Human Rights Act 1998 is in force, there is
the clearest public interest in giving effect to the right of freedom of expression in those
rare cases where this right trumps the rights conferred by the [U.K. Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988].”395
¶157
In addition, based upon Article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention,
which provides that freedom of expression is a fundamental right, Church of Scientology
v. XS4ALL396 ruled that the right to freedom of expression could trump copyright at issue.
¶158
The combination of the aforementioned cases clearly indicates that the free speech
right can override property rights under some circumstances. They teach that, in
considering rights enjoyed by copyright holders and users, courts should not presuppose
that copyright is necessarily stronger than users’ rights. By envisioning that fair use is
merely the affirmative defense available to users, courts actually water down the
importance of protecting public interest. In stark contrast, putting fair use exemptions
into the “power station” that produces the “electricity” formed of users’ privileges, means
391
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that courts should be fully mindful of and adequately sympathetic to the importance of
protecting users’ human rights. This is because granting privileges of this type aims to
provide breathing room to users, thereby obviating the chilling effects of proprietary
control on users’ enjoyment of human rights to freedom of expression, education, cultural
participation, and so forth.
¶159
To sum up, limitations on copyright are vehicles through which users’ fundamental
rights could be respected, protected and fulfilled in the case where such rights are in
conflict with creators’ copyrights. Careful and intimate consideration of users’
fundamental rights that lay the foundation for the state’s public policy, as the lesson
drawn from Eldred teaches, must be necessitated in gauging the validity and legitimacy
of any given copyright limitation. Yet the second prong of the three-step test, by
focusing solely on the scrutiny over whether copyright holders’ interest is adequately
protected, completely places such kind of consideration outside its orbit. For example,
the second prong of the three-step test can simply strike down section 110(5)(B) of the
U.S. Copyright Act on the grounds that it fosters economic competition between right
holders and the beneficiaries of this copyright limitation.397 However, this “death
sentence” decision was made without any consideration of the fact that section 110(5)(B)
is imbued with great free speech value.398 Moreover, it seems that the second prong of
the three-step test together with its first prong creates the strict scrutiny test for measuring
the validity of any given limitation on copyright. The strict scrutiny test, as this section
demonstrates, is an improper standard of review that is capable of striking down public
interest-oriented limitations on copyright.
C. Taking Copyright Holder’s Social Responsibilities Seriously
¶160

The inquiry into the legitimacy of the second prong of the three-step test begs
another question of whether it is appropriate for test to keep itself estranged from the
scrutiny of the extent to which copyright holders have the social responsibilities in return
for being granted a set of exclusive rights. Based upon the above discussion on the
protection of users’ fundamental rights, this section considers the grounds upon which
social responsibilities ought to be imposed upon copyright holders. It then argues that,
while wrestling with the formula restricting the scope of copyright limitations, the
architects of three-step test unfortunately turned a blind eye to the social responsibilities
that should have been imposed upon copyright holders.
1. Copyright and Social Responsibilities
i)

Reciprocity
¶161
Human beings are not insulated from one another; rather, we live in a social web of
interdependence and cooperation. The synergy sparked by human interaction and
collaboration provides the very momentum to sustain and enhance the machinery of
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human society. From this perspective, Nussbaum points out that it is “reciprocity” that
forms the fundamental nature of human life:
The core idea of [human nature] is that of the human being as a dignified free being
who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than
being passively shaped or pushed around by the world in the manner of a “flock” or
“herd” animal.399
Moreover, in the realm of societal relations, “reciprocity” can be seen as “a moral
virtue.” As a moral principle to which human beings should themselves subscribe, it
teaches that “[w]e ought to be disposed, as a mater of moral obligation, to return good in
proportion to the good we receive, and to make reparation from the harm we have
done.”400
When it comes to legal relations, Hart famously made the following statement by
drawing on the principle of reciprocity: “When any number of persons conduct any joint
enterprise according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to
these restrictions when required have a right to similar submission from those who have
benefited by their submission.”401
Obviously, Hart sees legal relations as the joint social enterprise collectively
pursued by people with the aim to achieve the common good. In a reciprocity-based
society, the mutual responsibility to act in accordance with legal rules is entrenched as a
crucial vehicle through which law can be capitalized on so as to advance the social
development in a healthy way. When it comes to the field of property, Hart’s vision of
joint social enterprise is buttressed by Rawlsian political principle of reciprocity:
[I]n a property-owning democracy the aim is to carry out the idea of
society as a fair system of cooperation over time among citizens as free
and equal persons . . . . To see the full force of the difference principle it
should be taken in the context of property-owning democracy (or of a
liberal socialist regime) and not a welfare state: it is a principle of
reciprocity, or mutuality, for society seen as fair system of cooperation
among free and equal citizens from one generation to the next.402

¶166

The very importance placed by Rawls in the above statement is indeed the “natural
duties [of] mutual respect.”403 According to him, only through entrenching the principle
of reciprocity deep into the fabric of property protection system can the institution of
democracy allow freedom and equality to flower. Consequently, the maxim that “[e]very
man is bound to use his own property in such a manner as not to injure the [rights] of his
neighbor”404 becomes the very motto in the so-called property-owning democracy. More
importantly, property-owning democracy based upon the principle of reciprocity should
be engineered to produce fair equality of opportunity for citizens. This means that

399
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property owners shall cooperatively participate in the joint scheme of redistributing
opportunities with others.405
¶167
Copyright law is also a joint enterprise in which creators and users work together in
the social machinery to achieve law’s ultimate aim of promoting the general public
interest.406 Within this joint enterprise, users submit themselves to copyright law which
requires them to respect the copyright vested in creators. In this way, they contribute to
the progress of science and useful arts, because the protection of copyright promoted by
users’ showing of respect for such form of property rights would result in sustained and
enhanced provision of works by creators. This would further foster a flowering of
knowledge for human development.
¶168
According to the principle of reciprocity, as long as users act in a manner respectful
of copyright, creators should and must be required to do something positive to the
promotion and protection of users’ rights. In this sense, the grant of copyright to creators
therefore intrinsically entails the social responsibilities imposed upon them. Put
differently, users can thereby forcefully petition creators to exercise their rights in a
manner conducive to the pursuit of public good. From this perspective, copyright holders
are required to come to terms with the socially beneficial use of their works by the public
at large. Under certain circumstances, they are further required to facilitate such kind of
use of copyrighted works.
2. Equality
¶169

Intellectual products are public goods in that they can be consumed in a
nonexclusive and nonrivalrous manner. As economists have pointed out, however, the
maker of intellectual products suffers from the so-called free-rider problem.407 When the
number of free riders keeps increasing, intellectual products “are likely to be produced at
socially suboptimal levels,”408 for the makers of such products would not reap the rewards
of their investments due to the competition brought about by free riders.409 Market failure
occurs in this context because resources for producing intellectual products are not
allocated to the person who directly and positively contributes to making such products.
Given the risk of a potentially inadequate provision of intellectual products, the
government confers exclusive rights, including copyright, upon creators, as one of the
means of dealing with the public goods problem.410 Through the grant of monopoly in
the form of property rights, the government aims to ameliorate the adverse effects arising
from the competition wrought by free-riders of intellectual products. In this sense,
conferring copyright is tapped into as the means to the ends of fostering efficiency in
producing, disseminating and exploiting intellectual products.

405
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Yet one should note that the efficiency-oriented approach to address the public
goods problem is by no means free of problems. Efficiency, as economists themselves
have acknowledged, at times leads to inequality in the distribution of wealth among
citizens. As Gregory Mankiw observed, “efficiency refers to the size of the economic
pie, and equity refers to how the pie is divided. Often, when government policies are
being designed, these two goals conflict.”411 In this regard, Felix Cohen, one of the
foremost American legal realists, provided a fresh insight into the potential inequality
wrought by the monopolization of public goods:
Language is socially useful apart from law, as air is socially useful, but
neither language nor air is a source of economic wealth unless some
people are prevented from using these resources in ways that are permitted
to other people. That is to say, property is a function of inequality . . . .
So, if courts prevent a man from exploiting certain forms of language
which another has already begun to exploit, the second user will be at the
economic disadvantage of having to pay the first user for the privilege of
using similar language or else of having to use the less appealing language
(generally) in presenting his [expressions] to the public.412

¶171

Indeed, this vision of the negative externalities produced by property approach to
deal with public goods problems, is also applicable to copyright protection of works, for
language used in any given work is the “bread and butter” used by people to bring to
fruition of the self-expression need. Against a backdrop of monopolistic control over the
expressions of ideas, at stake are users’ rights to free speech, education, cultural
participation and so on.
¶172
Therefore, monopolistic control over expressive words gives rise to unequal
distribution of public goods between copyright right holders and users. As Justice
Bradley pointed out in his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House case, “[the] granting
of monopolies lies, or exclusive privileges to individuals or corporations, is an invasion
of the right of others to choose a lawful calling, and an infringement of personal
liberty.”413 Without any social welfare oriented measures counteracting this inequality
problem, users are destined to be marginalized in the digital age. From this perspective,
it is likely that copyright provides economic protection for creators at the expense of
public interest and social welfare relating to the use of works of authorship. In order to
counteract the foregoing inequality problem occasioned by proprietary control of
expressive words, imposing social responsibilities upon copyright holders is a means of
achieving a “broad notion of equity” that copyright law is designed to serve.414
¶173
From the perspective of the Lockean natural rights justification for property
protection, the equality-based social responsibilities are twofold. First, Locke’s theory
teaches that the right to property, as the monopoly in a common mixed human labor, can
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sustain only if “there is enough and as good left in common for others.”415 This is widely
known as “sufficiency proviso.” Central to this provision is the assumption that the
eligibility to become a property owner depends upon whether others are left with
sufficient opportunities to use the common. In this respect, a property owner has the
social responsibility to eliminate the negative effects (occasioned by his exclusive
possession of certain products) on others’ well-being, which is in turn dependent upon a
reasonable degree of the availability of such products. This is because those who claim
property rights in certain products “should not do harm to other peoples’ claim to the
common.”416 If one does not carry out the social responsibilities in question before or
after being conferred with exclusive rights in certain products, he would surely be
ineligible to be vested with property rights. As copyright is a form of property right, the
social responsibility requirement should also apply to copyright holders. In this respect,
Gordon’s explication of the “sufficiency proviso” lends strong support to the social
responsibility requirement as the quid pro quo for the grant of exclusive rights to
creators:
The provision that “enough and as good [be] left” lies at the center of
natural rights justification for copyright protection: that creators should
have property in their original works, only provided that such grant of
property does no harm to other person’s equal abilities to create or to draw
upon the preexisting cultural matrix and scientific heritage. All persons
are equal and have an equal right to the common.417
¶174

Second, the creators’ social responsibilities to use the works in a socially beneficial
manner is also based on the Locke’s “no-spoilation” proviso which envisaged by him as
the inherent requirement for laborers’ continuous enjoyment of the property right in a
common mixed with their labor: “[I]f either the Grass or his Inclosure rotted on the
ground, or the Fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of
Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to be looked on as Waste, and might be the
Possession of any other.”418
¶175
The “no spoilation” proviso, therefore, makes clear that a person’s property right
can be invalidated “if he fails to exercise it or exercises it in such a ways as to prevent the
[property] from ever being useful in any way to anyone at all.”419 In this sense, the owner
of property shall not use property in a manner harmful to the promotion of social wellbeing. This proviso, when applied to copyright, requires that the creators, as the holders
of copyrights, shall not abuse their exclusive rights in ways that unreasonably constrain
users’ exercises of their pertinent human rights.

415
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3. Eldred

¶176

In Eldred, the Supreme Court acknowledged that social responsibilities are
imposed upon right holders as the quid pro quo for vesting them with patent rights.420
Yet, it rejected that the same idea could be applied to copyright.421 In doing so, the Court
based its denial on the distinction between the protections afforded to copyright and
patent.
We note [that] patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange,
and that our references to a quid pro quo typically appear in the patent
context . . . . [C]opyright gives the holder no monopoly on any
knowledge. A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any fact
or idea she acquires from her reading. The grant of a patent, on the other
hand, does prevent full use by others of the inventor’s knowledge.422

¶177

Yet the Supreme Court’s reasoning of whether the social responsibilities should be
imposed upon copyright holders is flawed in that a simple juxtaposition of patent and
copyright rights can not necessarily lead to the foregoing conclusion. Without digging
deep into other aspects of the nature of copyright protection and its accompanying social
problems as discussed in the above two subsections, the Court’s ruling against the
requirement of social responsibilities is unquestionably dubious. With the recent
expansion of copyright protection, it is not necessarily true that the protection afforded to
copyright holders, according to the letters of copyright law, does not enable them to
monopolize any knowledge. As Sega has pointed out, “the fact that computer programs
are distributed for public use in object code form often precludes public access to the
ideas and functional concepts contained in those programs, and thus confers on the
copyright owner a de facto monopoly over those ideas and functional concepts.”423
Moreover, the Court failed to bear in mind that the legal protection of technological
measures and non-original databases actually confers monopoly over ideas upon right
holders.
¶178
On the other hand, in overemphasizing the distinction between patent and copyright
protections, the Court failed to realize the very fact that copyright holders, in effect, wield
the power to exercise their rights in a manner contrary to the public interests. While it is
clear that the exclusivity of patent rights is generally stronger than that of copyright, it
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does not necessarily follow that the public are no longer vulnerable to the misuse of
copyright committed by copyright holders in various instances. Indeed, the copyright
misuse doctrine is actually the outgrowth the judicial effort to bring a halt to the
copyright holders’ monopolistic behaviors. In this sense, the doctrine is instrumental in
curbing the copyright holder’s power in exercising its rights in a way that it runs counter
to the ultimate aim of copyright law, i.e. “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good.” While great importance was attached to the line between patent and
copyright protections, the Supreme Court skirted around the crucial issue as to whether
the copyright may well be exercised in way contrary to the public interest. Worse still, it
failed to realize that the copyright misuse doctrine is borrowed from its counterpart in the
patent law. In Lasercomb, the Fourth Circuit invented the copyright misuse doctrine on
the basis of the vision that the monopolies possessed by the holders of patents and
copyright are relatively similar in nature:
It is significant [that] the framers of our Constitution . . . considered in
tandem [the] property rights protectable by copyrights and those
protectable by patents. In giving Congress the power to create copyright
and patent laws, the framers combined the two concepts in one clause,
stating a unitary purpose-to promote progress . . . . [S]ince copyright and
patent law serve parallel public interests, a “misuse” defense should apply
to infringement actions brought to vindicate either right . . . . [T]he
similarity of the policies underlying patent and copyright is great and
historically has been consistently recognized. Both patent law and
copyright law seek to increase the store of human knowledge and arts by
rewarding inventors and authors with the exclusive rights to their works
for a limited time. At the same time, the granted monopoly power does
not extend to property not covered by the patent or copyright.424
¶179

Therefore, by relying upon the distinction between copyright and patent, the Court
turned a blind eye to the common nature shared by these two forms of intellectual
property: the monopolistic control of subject matter concerned breeds abuse of rights.
From this perspective, if the social responsibility requirement applies to patent, the
Supreme Court can not and should not rule out the same requirement for copyright.
¶180
To sum up, the above discussion demonstrated that social responsibility is the very
quid pro quo for granting a bundle of exclusive rights to creators.425 The consideration of
the social responsibilities that are imposed upon copyright holders is essential to the
healthy development of copyright law. This is because law can not be advanced in the
single direction to enhance copyright holders’ interests. The building of copyright
holders’ social responsibilities is intended to facilitate pursuit of copyright law’s ultimate
value. It is critically important that such responsibilities are be woven into the fabric of
copyright law. Akin to Eldred, the second prong of the three-step test, however, alienates
copyright holders’ social responsibilities from scrutiny of the validity of any given
limitation on copyright.
424
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V. CONCLUSIONS

¶181

In Mending Wall, Robert Frost poetically rejected the hard-headed notion that
“[g]ood fences make good neighbors.”426 He thought that those who are zealous in
building good fences would sadly “mov[e] in darkness.”427 Indeed, what is implied in
Frost’s lamentation is that the so-called “good fences” protecting property rights would
not necessarily make a community awash with vibrancy, exuberance and coherence.
Some eighty years later, by stating the case for “building communities without building
walls,”428 Jerry Frug forcefully reminds us again that “good fences” are by no means the
very nostrum to “make good neighbors.”
¶182
The arrival of the digital age ushers globally-connected information superhighways
into the universe of human flourishing, mainstreaming and electrifying information as the
lifeblood of any given knowledge-based society. Thus, a robust flow of information has
become the electricity that provides the very energy to allow a host of new ideas to
flower beyond the orbit of conventional wisdom. Yet one should bear in mind that
technology, if manipulated by certain kind of centralized power, may well act as the
invisible “wall,” bringing a halt to the flowing of information which reaches the hearts
and minds of people at a lightning speech in the digital age.429
¶183
Copyright law might well represent one strand of such kind of centralized power, in
that it “regulates expressive activity.”430 In this regard, it has been pointed out that, while
digital technology interconnects people at all corners of the world into a digital global
village, “[c]opyright has emerged as one of the most important means of regulating the
international flow of ideas and knowledge-based products.”431 Hence both international
and national copyright laws “affec[t] the gains are shared, and in doing so affect[] the
pace of development within less developed countries.”432
¶184
By and large, the three-step test has become the catalyst for the continued
strengthening of copyright protection at the international, regional and national levels.
As this article has shown, the expansion of the three-step test has been premised on the
rhetoric that the unprecedented convenience of having access to and making use of works
afforded by digital technology, would necessarily mean that the copyright protection
should be beefed up by significantly narrowing down the scope of the limitations on
copyright. Put in Justice Breyer’s vein, we can boil down the dangers of keeping this test
intact as follows:
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[The three-step test] will cause serious expression-related harm. It will
likely restrict traditional dissemination of copyrighted works. It will likely
inhibit new forms of dissemination through the use of new technology. It
threatens to interfere with efforts to preserve our . . . historical and cultural
heritage and efforts to use that heritage, say, to educate our . . . children. It
is easy to understand how the statute might benefit the private financial
interests of corporations or heirs who own existing copyrights. But [we]
cannot find any constitutionally legitimate, copyright-related way in which
the statute will benefit the public. Indeed, in respect to existing works, the
serious public harm and the virtually nonexistent public benefit could not
be more clear.433
¶185

The copyright holder-centered premise upon which copyright law has been
advanced, however, is fundamentally flawed. As shown in this article, the promotion and
protection of users’ interests is indeed the heart of copyright law. Copyright limitations,
as the privileges granted to users and the social responsibilities imposed upon right
holders, are engineered to protect users’ human rights so as to foster an enhanced
promotion of free speech, education, cultural participation, and so on. Indeed, this
perspective opens up a new vision of the nature of copyright limitations and of the way in
which the current right holder-centered copyright law could be altered. The change of
the three-step test, therefore, can be seen as the first crucial step to usher in user-centered
copyright law. By rooting out the substantive and structural defects inherent into the
three-step test, the creative destruction model put forward in this article would open a
new chapter of tapping into the role of copyright in advancing the dissemination of
information and further delivering on the promise to afford an enhanced promotion of
public interest. As a new idea, it yet reflects a two-hundred-year-old wisdom that has
sunk to the bottom of the pool of copyright thoughts: “a man may fairly adopt part of the
work of another; he may so make use of another’s labors for the promotion of science,
and the benefit of the public.”434
¶186
To be sure, the recent amendment to the TRIPs Agreement triumphantly brought
about the global coalition against patent protection that has been anti-humanitarian,435 and
may spark the aura of “creative destruction” of the three-step test. This world-wide
campaign clearly shows that, as long as people are united together with a steadfast
commitment to combating an illegitimate rule, the hurdle to usher in a paradigm shift is
by no means insurmountable.436
¶187
Hence, it is highly time for us to create a revolutionary earthquake to break down
the very foundation on which the three-step test is founded. We shall also bear in mind
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that our post-earthquake task is to build up the user-centered copyright law which grants
broader privileges to users and imposes social responsibilities upon right holders. Armed
with a resounding denial of the right holder-centered copyright law, our Manifesto for
waging this “revolution” urges that “Users of copyrighted works in all countries,
unite!”437
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